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Abstract
This paper studies fingerprinting (traitor tracing) games in which the number of colluders
and the collusion channel are unknown. The fingerprints are embedded into host sequences
representing signals to be protected and provide the receiver with the capability to trace back
pirated copies to the colluders. The colluders and the fingerprint embedder are subject to signal
fidelity constraints. Our problem setup unifies the signal-distortion and Boneh-Shaw formula-
tions of fingerprinting. The fundamental tradeoffs between fingerprint codelength, number of
users, number of colluders, fidelity constraints, and decoding reliability are then determined.
Several bounds on fingerprinting capacity have been presented in recent literature. This
paper derives exact capacity formulas and presents a new randomized fingerprinting scheme with
the following properties: (1) the encoder and receiver assume a nominal coalition size but do
not need to know the actual coalition size and the collusion channel; (2) a tunable parameter ∆
trades off false-positive and false-negative error exponents; (3) the receiver provides a reliability
metric for its decision; and (4) the scheme is capacity-achieving when the false-positive exponent
∆ tends to zero and the nominal coalition size coincides with the actual coalition size.
A fundamental component of the new scheme is the use of a “time-sharing” randomized se-
quence. The decoder is a maximum penalized mutual information decoder, where the significance
of each candidate coalition is assessed relative to a threshold, and the penalty is proportional
to the coalition size. A much simpler threshold decoder that satisfies properties (1)—(3) above
but not (4) is also given.
Index Terms. Fingerprinting, traitor tracing, watermarking, data hiding, randomized codes,
universal codes, method of types, maximum mutual information decoder, minimum equivocation
decoder, channel coding with side information, capacity, strong converse, error exponents, multiple
access channels, model order selection.
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1 Introduction
Digital fingerprinting (a.k.a. traitor tracing) is essentially a multiuser version of watermarking.
A covertext — such as image, video, audio, text, or software — is to be distributed to many
users. Prior to distribution, each user is assigned a fingerprint that is embedded into the covertext.
In a collusion attack, a coalition of users combine their marked copies, creating a pirated copy
that contains only weak traces of their fingerprints. The pirated copy is subject to a fidelity
requirement relative to the coalition’s copies. The fidelity requirement may take the form of a
distortion constraint, which is a natural model for media fingerprinting applications [1–7]; or it may
take the form of Boneh and Shaw’s marking assumption, which is a popular model for software
fingerprinting [8–10]. To trace the forgery back to the coalition members, one needs a fingerprinting
scheme that can reliably identify the colluders’ fingerprints from the pirated copy.
The fingerprinting problem presents two key challenges.
1. The number of colluders may be large, which makes it easier for the colluders to mount a
strong attack. The difficulty of the decoding problem is compounded by the fact that the
number of colluders and the collusion channel are unknown to the encoder and decoder.
2. There are two fundamental types of error events, namely false positives, by which innocent
users are wrongly accused, and false negatives, by which one or more colluders escape detec-
tion. For legal reasons, a maximum admissible value for the false-positive error probability
should be specified.
This paper proposes a mathematical model that satisfies these requirements and derives the corre-
sponding information-theoretic performance limits. Prior art on related formulations of the finger-
printing problem is reviewed below.
The basic performance metric is capacity, which is defined with respect to a class of collusion
channels. A multiuser data hiding problem was analyzed by Moulin and O’Sullivan [3, Sec. 8], and
capacity expressions were obtained assuming a compound class of memoryless channels, expected-
distortion constraints for the distributor and the coalition, and noncooperating, single-user de-
coders. Despite clear mathematical similarities, this setup is quite different from the one adopted
in more recent fingerprinting papers. Somekh-Baruch and Merhav [4, 5] studied a fingerprinting
problem with a known number of colluders and explored connections with the problem of coding for
the multiple-access channel (MAC). The notion of false positives does not appear in their problem
formulation. Lower bounds on capacity were obtained assuming almost-sure distortion constraints
between the pirated copy and one [4] or all [5] of the coalition’s copies. The lower bounds on
capacity correspond to a restrictive encoding strategy, namely random constant-composition codes
without time-sharing.
Other bounds on capacity and connections between MACs and fingerprinting under the Boneh-
Shaw assumption have been recently studied by Anthapadmanabhan et al. [10]. The covertext is
degenerate, and side information does not appear in the information-theoretic formulation of this
problem.
In order to cope with unknown collusion channels and unknown number of colluders, a special
kind of universal decoder should be designed, where universality holds not only with respect to
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some set of channels, but also with respect to an unknown number of inputs. An early version of
this idea in the context of the so-called random MAC was introduced by Plotnik and Satt [11]. In
the context of fingerprinting, a tunable parameter should trade off the two fundamental types of
error probability. When the number of colluders is unknown, two extreme instances of this tradeoff
are to accuse all users or none of them.
While fingerprinting capacity is a fundamental measure of the ability of any scheme to resist
colluders, it only guarantees that the error probabilities vanish if the codes are “long enough”.
Error exponents provide a finer description of system performance. They provide estimates of the
necessary length of a fingerprinting code that can withstand a specified number of colluders, given
target false-positive and false-negative error probabilities. This is especially valuable in any legal
system where the reliability of accusations should be assessed.
Besides capacity and error-exponent formulas, the information-theoretic analysis sheds light
about the structure of optimal codes. Particularly relevant in this respect is a random coding
scheme by Tardos [9], which uses an auxiliary random sequence for encoding fingerprints. While his
scheme is presented at an algorithmic level (and no optimization was involved in its construction),
in our game-theoretic setting the auxiliary random variable appears fundamentally as part of a
randomized strategy in an information-theoretic game whose payoff function is nonconcave with
respect to the maximizing variable (the fingerprint distribution).
Another issue that can be resolved in our game-theoretic setting is the optimality of coalition
strategies that are invariant to permutations of the colluders. While one may heuristically expect
that such strategies are optimal, a proof of this property is established in this paper. The ap-
proach used in previous papers was to assume that coalitions employ such strategies, but often no
performance guarantee is given if the colluders employ asymmetric strategies.
Finally, in the aforementioned paper by Tardos [9] and in the signal processing literature, several
simple algorithms have been proposed to detect colluders, involving computing some correlation
score between pirated copy and users’ fingerprints, and setting up a detection threshold. We study
the limits of such strategies and compare them with joint decoding strategies.
1.1 Organization of This Paper
As indicated by the bibliographic references, probabilistic analyses of digital fingerprinting have
been reported both in the information theory literature and in the theoretical computer science
literature. While the results derived in this paper are put in the context of related information-
theoretic work, especially multiple-access channels, this paper is nevertheless intended to be ac-
cessible to a broader community of readers that are trained in probability theory and statistics.
The main tools used in our derivations are the method of types [12, 13] for analyzing random-
coding schemes, Fano’s lemma for deriving upper bounds on capacity, sphere-packing methods,
and elementary properties of information-theoretic functionals.
A mathematical statement of our generic fingerprinting problem is given in Sec. 2, together
with the definitions of codes, collusion channels, error probabilities, capacity, and error exponents.
Our first main results are fingerprinting capacity theorems. They are stated in Sec. 3.
The next two sections present the new random coding scheme and the resulting error exponents.
Sec. 4 presents a simple but suboptimal decoder that compares empirical mutual information scores
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between received data and individual fingerprints, and outputs a guilty decision whenever the score
exceeds a certain tunable threshold. This suboptimal decoder is closely related to strategies used in
the signal processing literature and in [9]. For simplicity of the exposition, the scheme and results
are presented in the setup with degenerate side information, which is directly applicable to the
Boneh-Shaw problem. Sec. 5 introduces and analyzes a more elaborate joint decoder that assigns
a penalized empirical equivocation score to candidate coalitions and selects the coalition with the
lowest score. The penalty is proportional to coalition size. The joint decoder is capacity-achieving.
Sec. 6 outlines an extension to the problem where the collusion channel is memoryless. The
proofs of the main results appear in Secs 7—10, and the paper concludes in Sec. 11.
1.2 Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables, lowercase letters for their individual values, calli-
graphic letters for finite alphabets, and boldface letters for sequences. Given an integer K, we use
the special symbol K for the set {1, 2, · · · ,K}. We denote by M⋆ the set of sequences of arbitrary
length (including 0) whose elements are inM. The probability mass function (p.m.f.) of a random
variable X ∈ X is denoted by pX = {pX(x), x ∈ X}. The variational distance between two p.m.f’s
p and q over X is denoted by dV (p, q) =
∑
x∈X |p(x)−q(x)|. The entropy of a random variable X is
denoted by H(X), and the mutual information between two random variables X and Y is denoted
by I(X;Y ) = H(X) −H(X|Y ). Should the dependency on the underlying p.m.f.’s be explicit, we
write the p.m.f.’s as subscripts, e.g., HpX (X) and IpX pY |X (X;Y ). The Kullback-Leibler divergence
between two p.m.f.’s p and q is denoted by D(p||q), and the conditional Kullback-Leibler divergence
of pY |X and qY |X given pX is denoted by D(pY |X ||qY |X |pX) = D(pY |X pX ||qY |X pX). All logarithms
are in base 2 unless specified otherwise.
Given a sequence x ∈ XN , denote by px its type, or empirical p.m.f. over the finite alphabet X .
Denote by Tx the type class associated with px, i.e., the set of all sequences of type px. Likewise,
pxy denotes the joint type of a pair of sequences (x,y) ∈ XN × YN , and Txy the associated joint
type class. The conditional type py|x of a pair of sequences (x,y) is defined by pxy(x, y)/px(x) for
all x ∈ X such that px(x) > 0. The conditional type class Ty|x given x, is the set of all sequences y˜
such that (x, y˜) ∈ Txy. We denote by H(x) the empirical entropy of the p.m.f. px, by H(y|x) the
empirical conditional entropy, and by I(x;y) the empirical mutual information for the joint p.m.f.
pxy. Recall that the number of types and conditional types is polynomial in N and that [12]
(N + 1)−|X | 2NH(x) ≤ |Tx| ≤ 2NH(x), (1.1)
(N + 1)−|X | |Y| 2NH(y|x) ≤ |Ty|x| ≤ 2NH(y|x). (1.2)
We use the calligraphic fonts PX and P
[N ]
X to represent the set of all p.m.f.’s and all empirical
p.m.f.’s for length-N sequences, respectively, on the alphabet X . Likewise, PY |X and P [N ]Y |X denote
the set of all conditional p.m.f.’s and all empirical conditional p.m.f.’s on the alphabet Y. The
special symbol WK will be used to denote the feasible set of collusion channels pY |X1,··· ,XK that can
be selected by a size-K coalition.
Mathematical expectation is denoted by the symbol E. The shorthands aN
.
= bN and aN
≤ bN
denote asymptotic relations in the exponential scale, respectively limN→∞ 1N log
aN
bN
= 0 and
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lim supN→∞
1
N log
aN
bN
≤ 0. We define |t|+ , max(t, 0), and exp2(t) , 2t. The indicator function of
a set A is denoted by 1{x ∈ A}. The symbol A \ B is used to denote the relative complement (or
set-theoretic difference) of set B in set A. (Note that B is generally not a subset of A.) Finally,
we adopt the notational convention that the minimum of a function over an empty set is +∞, and
the maximum is 0.
2 Problem Statement and Basic Definitions
2.1 Overview
class[WK]D
Host sequence
Secret key
S
V
X2NR
2
1
Fingerprints
fingerprints
DecodedPirated
copy
Coalition
copies
Y
g
DecoderCollusion
channel
1
mKm1Y|X   , ..., XP
Fingerprinted
.
.
K
2NR
2
NN
mK
m2
m1
1
X
KX
X
Choose
.
.
X
X
Encoder
f.
.
Figure 1: Model for fingerprinting game, using randomized code (fN , gN ). In the Boneh-Shaw
setup, the host sequence S is degenerate and there is no distortion constraint (D1). The class
WK characterizes the fidelity constraint on the collusion channel. The encoder and decoder know
neither K nor the collusion channel.
Our model for digital fingerprinting is diagrammed in Fig. 1. Let S, X , and Y be three
finite alphabets. The covertext sequence S = (S1, · · · , SN ) ∈ SN consists of N independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples drawn from a p.m.f. pS(s), s ∈ S. A secret key V taking
values in an alphabet VN , whose cardinality potentially grows with N , is shared between encoder
and decoder, and not publicly revealed. The key V is a random variable independent of S. There
are 2NR users, each of which receives a fingerprinted copy:
Xm = fN(S, V,m), 1 ≤ m ≤ 2NR, (2.3)
where fN : SN × VN × {1, · · · , 2NR} → XN is the encoding function, and m is the index of the
user. The fidelity requirement between S and Xm is expressed via a distortion constraint. Let
d : S × X → R+ be the distortion measure and dN (s,x) = 1N
∑N
i=1 d(si, xi) the extension of this
measure to length-N sequences. The code fN is subject to the distortion constraint
dN (s,xm) ≤ D1, 1 ≤ m ≤ 2NR. (2.4)
Let K , {m1, m2 , · · · , mK} be a coalition of K users; no constraints are imposed on the
formation of coalitions. The coalition uses its copies XK , {Xm, m ∈ K} to produce a pirated
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copy Y ∈ YN . Without loss of generality, we assume that Y is generated stochastically according
to a conditional p.m.f. pY|XK called the collusion channel. This includes deterministic mappings
as a special case. A fidelity constraint is imposed on pY|XK to ensure that Y is “close” to the
fingerprinted copies Xm, m ∈ K. This constraint may take the form of a distortion constraint
(analogously to (2.4)), or alternatively, a constraint that will be referred to as the Boneh-Shaw
constraint. The formulation of these constraints is detailed below and results in the definition of a
feasible set WK(pxK) for the conditional type py|xK .
The encoder and decoder assume a nominal coalition size Knom but know neither K nor pY|XK
selected by the K colluders 1. The decoder has access to the pirated copy Y, the host S, and the
secret key V . It produces an estimate
Kˆ = gN (Y,S, V ) (2.5)
of the coalition. Success can be defined as catching one colluder or catching all colluders, the latter
task being seemingly much more difficult. An admissible decoder output is the empty set, Kˆ = ∅,
reflecting the possibility that the signal submitted to the decoder is unrelated to the fingerprints.
If this possibility was not allowed, an innocent user would be accused. Another good reason to
allow Kˆ = ∅ is simply that reliable detection is impossible when there are too many colluders, and
the constraint on the probability of false positives would be violated if Kˆ = ∅ was not an option.
2.2 Randomized Fingerprinting Codes
The formal definition of a fingerprinting code is as follows.
Definition 2.1 A randomized rate-R length-N fingerprinting code (fN , gN ) with embedding
distortion D1 is a pair of encoder mapping fN : SN ×VN ×{1, 2, · · · , ⌈2NR⌉} → XN and decoder
mapping gN : YN × SN × VN → {1, 2, · · · , ⌈2NR⌉}⋆.
Many kinds of randomization are possible. In the most general setting, the key space VN
can grow superexponentially with N . For fingerprinting, three kinds of randomization seem to be
fundamental, each serving a different purpose. All three kinds can be combined. The first one is
randomized permutation of the letters {1, 2, · · · , N} to cope with channels with arbitrary memory,
similarly to [14].
Definition 2.2 A randomly modulated (RM) fingerprinting code is a randomized fingerprinting
code defined via permutations of a prototype (f˜N , g˜N ). The code is of the form
xm = f˜
π
N (s, w,m) , π
−1f˜N (πs, w,m)
g˜πN (y, s, w) , g˜N (πy, πs, w) (2.6)
where π is chosen uniformly from the set of all N ! permutations of the letters {1, 2, · · · , N} and
is not revealed publicly. The sequence πxm is obtained by applying π to the elements of xm. The
secret key is V = (π,W ), where W is independent of π.
The second kind of randomization is uniform permutations of the 2NR fingerprint assignments,
to equalize error probabilities over all possible coalitions [7, 10].
1 If Knom = K, our random coding scheme of Sec. 5 is capacity-achieving.
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Definition 2.3 A randomly permuted (RP) fingerprinting code is a randomized fingerprinting
code defined via permutations of a prototype (f˜N , g˜N ). The code is of the form
xm = f˜
π
N (s, w,m) , f˜N (s, w, π
−1(m))
g˜πN (y, s, w) , π (g˜N (y, s, w)) (2.7)
where π is chosen uniformly from the set of all 2NR! permutations of the user indices {1, 2, · · · , 2NR}
and is not revealed publicly. The secret key is V = (π,W ), where W is independent of π. In (2.7),
we have used the shorthand π(Kˆ) , {π(m), m ∈ Kˆ}.
The third kind of randomization arises via an auxiliary “time-sharing” random sequence. This
strategy was not used in [4,5,10] but a remarkable example was developed by Tardos [9]. For binary
alphabets S, X , and Y, i.i.d. random variables Wi ∈ (0, 1), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , are generated, and next
the fingerprint letters Xi(m) are generated as independent Bernoulli (Wi) random variables. Here
V = {Wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} is the secret key shared by encoder and decoder.
Given an embedding distortion D1 and a size–K coalition using a collusion channel from class
WK , there corresponds a capacity C(D1,WK) which is the supremum over (fN , gN ) of all achievable
R, under a prescribed error criterion.
2.3 Collusion Channels
First we define some basic terminology for MACs with K inputs, common input alphabet X , and
output alphabet Y. Recall that K = {1, 2, · · · ,K} and letXK = {X1, · · · ,XK}. Given a conditional
p.m.f. pY |XK, consider the permuted conditional p.m.f.
pY |Xpi(K)(y|x1, · · · , xK) , pY |XK(y|xπ(1), · · · , xπ(K)) (2.8)
where π is any permutation of the K inputs. We say that pY |XK is permutation-invariant if
pY |Xpi(K) = pY |XK , ∀π.
A subset WK of PY |XK is said to be permutation-invariant if
pY |XK ∈ WK ⇒ pY |Xpi(K) ∈ WK , ∀π.
In general, not all elements of such WK are permutation-invariant. The subset of permutation-
invariant WK that consists of permutation-invariant conditional p.m.f.’s will be denoted by
W
fair
K =
{
pY |XK ∈ WK : pY |Xpi(K) = pY |XK , ∀π
}
. (2.9)
Finally, if WK is permutation-invariant and convex, the permutation-averaged conditional p.m.f.
1
K!
∑
π pY |Xpi(K) is also in WK and is permutation-invariant by construction.
In the fingerprinting problem, the conditional type py|xK ∈ P [N ]Y |XK is a random variable whose
conditional distribution given xK depends on the collusion channel pY|XK . Our fidelity constraint
on the coalition is of the general form
Pr[py|xK ∈ WK(pxK)] = 1, (2.10)
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where for each pxK , WK(pxK) is a convex, permutation-invariant subset of PY |XK . That is,
the empirical conditional p.m.f. of the pirated copy given the marked copies is restricted. The
choice of the feasible set WK(pxK) depends on the application, as elaborated below. The explicit
dependency of WK on pxK will sometimes be omitted to simplify notation. Note that assuming WK
is permutation-invariant does not imply that py|xK actually selected by the coalition is permutation-
invariant. Finally, it is assumed that the set-valued mapping WK(p) is defined for p ∈ PXK and
is uniformly continuous in the variational distance, in the sense that for every ǫ > 0, there exists
δ > 0 such that
∀pXK, p′XK ∈ PXK s.t. dV (pXK , p′XK) < δ :
max
pY |X
K
∈WK (pX
K
)
min
p′
Y |X
K
∈WK(p′X
K
)
dV (pY |XK pXK , p
′
Y |XK p
′
XK
) < ǫ. (2.11)
The model (2.10) can be used to impose hard distortion constraints on the coalition or to enforce
the Boneh-Shaw marking assumption when X = Y.
1. Distortion Constraints. Consider the following variation on the constraints used in [3–5].
Define a permutation-invariant estimator f : XK → S which produces an estimate Sˆ =
f(XK) of the host signal sample based on the corresponding marked samples. 2 The estimator
could be, e.g., a maximum-likelihood estimator. Then
WK(pxK) =
{
pY |XK :
∑
xK,y
pxK(xK) pY |XK(y|xK) d2(f(xK), y) ≤ D2
}
(2.12)
where d2 : S×Y → R+ is the coalition’s distortion function, and D2 is the maximum allowed
distortion. The constraint (2.10) may be equivalently written as
Pr
[
dN2 (f(xK),y) =
1
N
N∑
t=1
d2(f(xK,t), yt) ≤ D2
]
= 1. (2.13)
2. Interleaving Attack. Here each colluder contributes N/K samples to the forgery – taken
at arbitrary positions. The class WK is a singleton:
pY |XK(y|xK) =
1
K
∑
k∈K
1{y=xk}. (2.14)
3. Boneh-Shaw Marking Assumption. Assume X = Y and WK is the set of conditional
p.m.f.’s that satisfy
x1 = · · · = xK ⇒ y = x1. (2.15)
Then the constraint (2.10) enforces the Boneh-Shaw marking assumption: the colluders are
not allowed to modify their samples at any location where these samples agree. Thus yt =
xm1,t at any position 1 ≤ t ≤ N such that xm1,t = · · · = xmK ,t. Note that WK does not
depend on pxK and that the interleaving attack (2.14) satisfies the Boneh-Shaw condition.
2 A permutation-invariant estimator depends on the samples {Xk, k ∈ K} only via their empirical distribution on
X .
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2.4 Strongly Exchangeable Collusion Channels
Recall the definition of RM codes in (2.6); a dual notion applies to collusion channels. For any pY|XK
and permutation π of {1, 2, · · · , N}, define the permuted channel pπ
Y|XK(y|xK) , pY|XK(πy|πxK).
Then we have
Definition 2.4 [4] A strongly exchangeable collusion channel pY|XK is a channel such that
pπ
Y|XK(y|xK) is independent of π, for every (xK,y).
A strongly exchangeable collusion channel is defined by a probability assignment Pr[Ty|xK ] on
the conditional type classes. The distribution of Y conditioned on Y ∈ Ty|xK is uniform:
pY|XK(y˜|xK) =
Pr[Ty|xK ]
|Ty|xK |
, ∀y˜ ∈ Ty|xK . (2.16)
In Sec. 2.6 we show that for RM codes (fN , gN ), it is sufficient to consider strongly exchange-
able collusion channels to derive worst-case error probabilities. Moreover, in the error probability
calculations for random codes it will be sufficient to use the trivial upper bound
Pr[Ty|xK ] ≤ 1{py|xK ∈ WK(pxK)}. (2.17)
2.5 Fair Coalitions
Two notions of fairness for coalitions will be useful. Denote by π a permutation of {1, 2, · · · ,K}.
Definition 2.5 The collusion channel pY|XK is permutation-invariant if
pY|XK(y|xm1 , · · · ,xmK ) = pY|XK(y|xπ(m1), · · · ,xπ(mK )), ∀π. (2.18)
For instance, if X = Y and K = 2, the collusion channel
pY|X1X2(y|x1,x2) =
1
2
[1{y = x1}+ 1{y = x2}] (2.19)
is permutation-invariant. Given x1,x2, there are two equally likely choices for the pirated copy,
namely y = x1 and y = x2. Note that one colluder carries full risk and the other one zero risk. A
stronger definition of fairness (which will not be needed in this paper) would require some kind of
ergodic behavior of the inputs and output of the collusion channel.
Definition 2.6 The collusion channel pY|XK is first-order fair if Pr[py|xK ∈ W fairK (pxK)] = 1.
For any first-order fair collusion channel, the conditional type py|xK is invariant to permutations
of the colluders, with probability 1. For instance, if X = Y and K = 2, any collusion channel
pY|XK resulting in the conditional type py|x1x2(y|x1, x2) = 12 [1{y = x1}+ 1{y = x2}] is first-order
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fair. This is an interleaving attack in which each colluder contributes exactly N/2 samples (in any
order) to the pirated copy.
A first-order fair collusion channel is not necessarily permutation-invariant, and vice-versa. Fur-
ther, if a collusion channel is first-order fair and strongly exchangeable, then it is also permutation-
invariant. However the converse is not true. For instance the collusion chanel of (2.19) is
permutation-invariant and strongly exchangeable but not first-order fair because the conditional
type py|xK(y|x1, x2) is given by either 1{y = x1} or 1{y = x2}, neither of which is permutation-
invariant.
2.6 Error Probabilities
Let K be the coalition and Kˆ = gN (Y,S, V ) the decoder’s output. There are several error proba-
bilities of interest: the probability of false positives (one or more innocent users are accused):
PFP(fN , gN , pY|XK) = Pr[Kˆ \ K 6= ∅], (2.20)
the probability of missed detection for a specific coalition member m ∈ K:
Pe,m(fN , gN , pY|XK) = Pr[m /∈ Kˆ],
the probability of failing to catch a single colluder:
P onee (fN , gN , pY|XK) = Pr[Kˆ ∩ K = ∅], (2.21)
and the probability of failing to catch the full coalition:
P alle (fN , gN , pY|XK) = Pr[K 6⊆ Kˆ]. (2.22)
The error criteria (2.21) and (2.22) will be referred to as the detect-one and detect-all criteria,
respectively.
The above error probabilities may be written in the explicit form
Pe(fN , gN , pY|XK) =
∑
v,s,xK,y
pV (v) p
N
S (s)
(∏
m∈K
1{xm = fN(s, v,m)}
)
pY|XK(y|xK)1{E} (2.23)
where the error event E is given by EFP = {gN (y, s, v) \K 6= ∅}, or Eone = {gN (y, s, v) ∩K = ∅}, or
Eall = {K 6⊆ gN (y, s, v)}, when Pe is given by (2.20), (2.21), and (2.22), respectively. The worst-case
probability is given by
Pe(fN , gN ,WK) = max
pY|XK
Pe(fN , gN , pY|XK)
where the maximum is over all feasible collusion channels, i.e., such that (2.10) holds.
Maximum vs average error probability. The error probabilities (2.20)—(2.22) generally
depend on K. Prop. 2.1 below states that (a) in order to make them independent of K and
provide guarantees on error probability for any coalition, one may use RP codes, and (b) random
permutations of fingerprint assignments cannot increase the average error probability of any code.
Let (f˜N , g˜N ) be an arbitrary code and (fN , gN ) the RP code of (2.7), obtained using (f˜N , g˜N ) as
a prototype. Let pY|XK be an arbitrary collusion channel when coalition K is in effect. Given
any other coalition K′ = π(K) of the same size, let pY|XK′ be the corresponding collusion channel,
obtained by applying (2.8), where π is now a permutation of {1, · · · , 2NR}.
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Proposition 2.1 For any code f˜N , g˜N and collusion channel pY|XK, we have
∀K′ : Pe(fN , gN , pY|XK′ ) = Pe(fN , gN , pY|XK) ≤ maxK′ Pe(f˜N , g˜N , pY|XK′ ) (2.24)
where (fN , gN ) is the RP code of (2.7), and Pe denotes any of the error probability criteria (2.20),
(2.21), and (2.22).
Proof. First consider the detect-one error criterion of (2.21): an error arises if gN (Y,S, V )∩K = ∅.
Given a RP fingerprinting code with prototype (f˜N , g˜N ) and permutation parameter π, the detect-
one error probability when coalition K is in effect is given by
P onee (fN , gN , pY|XK) = Pr[gN (Y,S, V ) ∩ K = ∅]
= Pr[g˜πN (Y,S,W ) ∩ K = ∅]
= Pr[π (g˜N (Y,S,W )) ∩ K = ∅]
= Pr[g˜N (Y,S,W ) ∩ π−1(K) = ∅]
= EY,S,W
1
2NR!
∑
π
1{g˜N (Y,S,W ) ∩ π−1(K) = ∅}︸ ︷︷ ︸
independent of K
(2.25)
which is independent of K, by virtue of the uniform distribution on π. The derivation for the
detect-all and the false-positive error probabilities is analogous to (2.25). This establishes the first
equality in (2.24). The inequality is proved similarly. ✷
False Positives vs False Negatives. The tradeoff between false positives and false negatives
is central to statistical detection theory (the Neyman-Pearson problem) and list decoding [15].
Note that in the classical formulation of list decoding [16, p. 166], an error is declared only if
the message sent does not appear on the decoder’s output list. The false-negative error exponent
increases with list size and approaches the sphere packing exponent if the list size is allowed to grow
subexponentially with N . This classical formulation does not include a cost for “false positives”.
2.7 Strongly Exchangeable Collusion Channels
Prop. 2.2 below states that randomly modulated codes (Def. 2.2) and strongly exchangeable chan-
nels (Def. 2.4) satisfy a certain equilibrium property: neither the fingerprint embedder nor the
coalition has interest in deviating from those strategies. Let (f˜N , g˜N ) be an arbitrary code and
(fN , gN ) the RM code of (2.6), obtained using f˜N , g˜N as a prototype. Given any feasible collusion
channel pY|XK , denote by
pY|XK(y|xK) =
1
N !
∑
π
pY|XK(πy|πxK) (2.26)
the permutation-averaged channel, which is feasible and strongly exchangeable.
Proposition 2.2 For any code f˜N , g˜N and collusion channel pY|XK, we have
Pe(fN , gN , pY|XK) = Pe(fN , gN , pY|XK)
= Pe(f˜N , g˜N , pY|XK) ≤ maxπ Pe(f˜N , g˜N , p
π
Y|XK) (2.27)
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where (fN , gN ) is the RM code of (2.6) and Pe denotes any of the error probability criteria (2.20),
(2.21), and (2.22).
Proof. First consider the detect-one error criterion of (2.21): an error arises if g˜N (Y,S, V )∩K =
∅. For any fixed K, the detect-one error probability is an average over all possible permutations π
and the other random variables V,S,Y:
P onee (fN , gN , pY|XK)
(a)
=
1
N !
∑
π
∑
w,s,xK,y
pW (w) p
N
S (s)
(∏
m∈K
1{πxm = f˜N (πs, w,m)}
)
pY|XK(y|xK)
×1{g˜N (πy, πs, w) ∩ K = ∅}
(b)
=
1
N !
∑
π
∑
w,s,xK,y
pW (w) p
N
S (π
−1s)
(∏
m∈K
1{xm = f˜N (s, w,m)}
)
pY|XK(π
−1y|π−1xK)
×1{g˜N (y, s, w) ∩K = ∅}
(c)
=
∑
w,s,xK,y
pW (w) p
N
S (s)
(∏
m∈K
1{xm = f˜N (s, w,m)}
)(
1
N !
∑
π
pY|XK(π
−1y|π−1xK)
)
×1{g˜N (y, s, w) ∩K = ∅}
=
∑
w,s,xK,y
pW (w) p
N
S (s)
(∏
m∈K
1{xm = f˜N (s, w,m)}
)(
1
N !
∑
π
pπY|XK(y|xK)
)
×1{g˜N (y, s, w) ∩K = ∅}
=
∑
w,s,xK,y
pW (w) p
N
S (s)
(∏
m∈K
1{xm = f˜N (s, w,m)}
)
pY|XK(y|xK) 1{g˜N (y, s, w) ∩K = ∅}
= P onee (fN , gN , pY|XK) (2.28)
where (a) holds by definition of the RM code, (b) is obtained by applying the change of variables
z ← πz to the sequences s,xK,y, and (c) the fact that pNS (s) = pNS (πs). The derivation for the
detect-all and the false-positive error probabilities is analogous to (2.28). This establishes the first
equality in (2.27). The second equality and the inequality are proved similarly. ✷
2.8 Risk for Fair Coalitions
The maximum and the minimum of the error probabilities Pe,m(K), m ∈ K, will be useful. The
maximum value,
P e(fN , gN , pY|XK) = maxm∈K
Pe,m(fN , gN , pY|XK), (2.29)
is the conventional error criterion for information transmission. However, the minimum value,
P e(fN , gN , pY|XK) = minm∈K
Pe,m(fN , gN , pY|XK), (2.30)
is more relevant to the coalition because it represents the risk of their most vulnerable member.
Note that
P onee (fN , gN , pY|XK) ≤ P e(fN , gN , pY|XK) ≤ P e(fN , gN , pY|XK) ≤ P alle (fN , gN , pY|XK).
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While it is conceivable that some colluders could be tricked or coerced into taking a higher risk
than others, such strategy is not secure because the whole coalition would be at risk if some of
its members, especially the vulnerable ones, are caught. The proof of the following proposition is
elementary.
Proposition 2.3 For randomly permuted codes (Def. 2.3), if the collusion channel pY|XK is
permutation-invariant, then all colluders incur the same risk:
P e(fN , gN , pY|XK) = P e(fN , gN , pY|XK).
The proof of the following proposition is omitted because it is similar to that of Prop. 2.2.
Assuming the fingerprint distributor uses RP codes, it follows from Prop. 2.4 that permutation-
invariant collusion channels are optimal for the colluders under the detect-one error criterion.
Proposition 2.4 For randomly permuted codes, the maximum of the error probability criteria
(2.20) and (2.21) is achieved by a permutation-invariant collusion channel ((2.18)) under the detect-
one criterion.
Taken together with Prop. 2.1 on optimality of randomly-permuted fingerprinting codes,
Prop. 2.4 implies an equilibrium property: neither the fingerprint embedder nor the coalition has
interest in deviating from these symmetric strategies, under the detect-one criterion.
2.9 Capacity
Having defined the detect-one and detect-all error criteria and feasible classes of codes and collusion
channels, we may now define the corresponding notions of fingerprinting capacity.
Definition 2.7 A rate R is achievable for embedding distortion D1, collusion class WK , and
detect-one criterion if there exists a sequence of (N, ⌈2NR⌉) randomized codes (fN , gN ) with max-
imum embedding distortion D1, such that both P
one
e (fN , gN ,WK) and PFP(fN , gN ,WK) vanish as
N →∞.
Definition 2.8 A rate R is achievable for embedding distortion D1, collusion class WK , and
detect-all criterion if there exists a sequence of (N, ⌈2NR⌉) randomized codes (fN , gN ) with max-
imum embedding distortion D1, such that both P
all
e (fN , gN ,WK) and PFP(fN , gN ,WK) vanish as
N →∞.
Definition 2.9 Fingerprinting capacities Cone(D1,WK) and C
all(D1,WK) are the suprema of all
achievable rates with respect to the detect-one and detect-all criteria, respectively.
We have Call(D1,WK) ≤ Cone(D1,WK) because an error event for the detect-one problem is
also an error event for the detect-all problem.
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2.10 Random-Coding Exponents
For a sequence of randomized codes (fN , gN ), the error exponents are defined as
E(R,D1,WK) = lim inf
N→∞
[
− 1
N
logPe(fN , gN ,WK)
]
where E represents the random coding exponent EFP, E
one, or Eall. Moreover, Eall(R,D1,WK) ≤
Eone(R,D1,WK) because an error event for the detect-one problem is also an error event for the
detect-all problem. We have Eall = 0 if the class WK includes channels in which one colluder can
“stay out,” i.e., not contribute to the pirated copy.
Fig. 2 gives a preview of Eone and EFP for our random coding scheme, viewed as a function
of the number K of colluders. The false-positive exponent EFP is equal to ∆, for any value of K.
The false-negative exponent Eone decreases with K, up to some maximum value KR,∆ where it
becomes zero. The decoder outputs Kˆ = ∅ with high probability, and therefore reliable decoding
of any colluder is impossible, for any K ≥ KR,∆.
Fig. 3 illustrates the maximum rate R(K,∆) that can be accommodated by the random coding
scheme, for fixed ∆. This rate decreases with K and becomes zero for K ≥ K∆. If ∆ ↓ 0, the rate
curve R(K,∆) tends to the capacity function C(K). Note that C(K) vanishes as K → ∞ but is
generally positive for any finite K; in this case, lim∆→0K∆ =∞.
1 nom KR,∆
EFP
(K,   )∆Eone
Error Exponents
K
∆
K
Figure 2: False-positive and false-negative error exponents, as a function of coalition size K, for
fixed values of R and ∆.
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C(K)
K ∆K
∆R(K,   )
Rate
K
1 nom
Figure 3: Capacity C and achievable rate R (for false-positive error exponent equal to ∆), as a
function of coalition size K.
2.11 Memoryless Collusion Channels
As an alternative to the collusion channels subject to the hard constraint Pr[py|xK ∈ WK(pxK)] = 1,
we may consider memoryless collusion channels:
pY|XK(y|xK) =
N∏
t=1
pY |XK(yt|xK,t) (2.31)
where pY |XK ∈ WK(pxK), viewed as a compound class of channels [12]. As we shall see there is
a strong link between the two problems in the form of Lemma 3.3 which is used to establish our
converse theorems; also see Sec. 6.
3 Fingerprinting Capacity
This section presents fingerprinting capacity formulas under the detect-one and detect-all error
criteria. To put these results in context, let us first recall related results for MACs. In the absence
of side information, the capacity region of the MAC was determined by Ahlswede [17] and Liao [18].
This region is also achievable for the randomMAC [11]. For the MAC with common side information
at the transmitter and receiver, some very general capacity formulas were derived by Das and
Narayan [19] under the assumption that S is an ergodic process. In some special cases these
formulas can be single-letterized. For fingerprinting with i.i.d. S and coalition size equal to 2,
bounds on capacity were derived in [4, 5]. Thus the presence of the side information S causes
difficulties in deriving single-letter capacity formulas for both MAC and fingerprinting problems.
The proof of the converse under the detect-all criterion is based on the standard Fano inequality.
Surprisingly, Fano’s inequality does not seem to be the right tool to prove the converse under the
detect-one criterion [20]. A strong converse was presented in [10], but the resulting upper bound
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on capacity is loose. The direction we have pursued is based on explicit sphere-packing arguments,
specifically the fact that typical sets for Y given the embedded fingerprints cannot have too much
statistical overlap, otherwise reliable decoding is impossible. The tools used here are different from
those used for classical problems such as the single-user discrete memoryless channel [16, pp. 173—
176] and the MAC [21]. The use of a detect-one criterion requires a different machinery. A simple
technique is used to deal with codeword pairs whose self-information score is well above average,
and suffices to show that the error probability cannot vanish for rates above capacity. We conjecture
that a strong converse holds, namely: for any rate above capacity,
lim
N→∞
min
fN ,gN
max{P onee (fN , gN ,WK), PFP(fN , gN ,WK)} = 1.
However, establishing this stronger result may require use of elaborate wringing techniques [21].
Our lower bound on error probability does not tend to 1 as N → ∞ because the bound (8.50) is
likely loose.
3.1 Mutual-Information Games
The following lemma relates to Han’s inequalities [22] and will be useful throughout this paper. Its
proof appears in Appendix A.
Lemma 3.1 Let K = {1, 2, · · · ,K} and assume the distribution of (XK, Z) is invariant to permu-
tations of K. Then for any nested sets A ⊆ B ⊆ K, we have
1
|A|H(XA|ZXK\A) ≤
1
|B|H(XB|ZXK\B), (3.1)
1
|A|H(XA|Z) ≥
1
|B|H(XB|Z). (3.2)
Both inequalities hold with equality if Xk, k ∈ K, are conditionally independent given Z.
We will derive two simple formulas by application of this lemma. First, applying (3.1) with
Z = (Y, S,W ) and (3.2) with Z = (S,W ) and subtracting the first inequality from the second, we
obtain
1
|A|I(XA;Y XK\A|SW ) ≥
1
|B|I(XB;Y XK\B|SW ), ∀A ⊆ B ⊆ K (3.3)
with equality if Xk, k ∈ K, are conditionally independent given Z. Second, for Xk, k ∈ K condi-
tionally i.i.d. given (S,W ), we have
I(X1;Y |S,W ) = H(X1|S,W )−H(X1|Y, S,W )
=
1
K
H(XK|S,W )−H(X1|Y, S,W )
≤ 1
K
H(XK|S,W )− 1
K
H(XK|Y, S,W )
=
1
K
I(XK;Y |S,W ) (3.4)
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where the inequality follows from (3.2) with Z = (Y, S,W ).
Now consider an auxiliary random variable W defined over an alphabetW = {1, 2, · · · , L}, and
independent of S. Define the set of conditional p.m.f.’s
PXKW |S(pS , L,D1)
,
{
pXKW |S = pW
∏
k∈K
pXk|SW : pX1|SW = · · · = pXK |SW , Ed(S,X1) ≤ D1
}
(3.5)
and the functions
ConeL (D1,WK) = max
pX
K
W |S∈PX
K
W |S(pS ,L,D1)
min
pY |X
K
∈W fair
K
(pX
K
)
1
K
I(XK;Y |S,W ) (3.6)
CallL (D1,WK) = max
pX
K
W |S∈PX
K
W |S(pS ,L,D1)
min
pY |X
K
∈WK(pX
K
)
min
A⊆K
1
|A|I(XA;Y |S,XK\A,W ). (3.7)
Using the same derivation as in Lemma 2.1 of [14], it is easily shown that ConeL (D1,WK) and
CallL (D1,WK) are nondecreasing functions of L and converge to finite limits:
C˜one(D1,WK) , lim
L→∞
ConeL (D1,WK) (3.8)
C˜all(D1,WK) , lim
L→∞
CallL (D1,WK). (3.9)
Moreover, the gap to each limit may be bounded by a polynomial function of L, see [14, Sec. 3.5]
for a similar derivation. The basic idea is to discretize each WK(pXK) to a fine grid of L˜ collusion
channels. By application of Caratheodory’s theorem, the supremum of CL over L is achieved by
L ≤ |S| |X | + L˜. The gap between the minimum of the cost function over WK(pXK) and over its
discrete approximation can be bounded by c L˜−|Y|−1 |X |−K where c is a constant.
Since W fairK (pXK) ⊆ WK(pXK), we have C˜all(D1,W fairK ) ≥ C˜all(D1,WK). In fact the right side is
zero if WK(pXK) contains conditional p.m.f.’s pY |XK such that Y is independent of one of the inputs
Xk, k ∈ K.
Lemma 3.2 For any D1 and WK we have
C˜all(D1,WK) ≤ C˜one(D1,WK). (3.10)
Equality holds for any class of fair collusion channels (WK = W
fair
K ).
Proof: Property (3.10) follows from (3.6)—(3.9) and the fact that W fairK (pXK) ⊆ WK(pXK). Now
consider WK = W
fair
K . Application of Property (3.3) to any fair collusion channel yields
1
|K|I(XK;Y |S,W ) ≤
1
|A|I(XA;Y |XK\A, S,W ), ∀A ⊆ K.
Hence the inner minimum in (3.7) is achieved by A = K, and equality holds in (3.10). ✷
17
3.2 Capacity Theorems
The following lemma will be used to prove Theorems 3.5 and 3.7 below. Its proof is given in
Appendix B and borrows ideas from [14, Theorem 3.7].
Lemma 3.3 Consider the compound family WK(pxK) of memoryless channels in (2.31). Under
both the detect-one and detect-all criteria, the compound capacity for this problem is an upper
bound on the capacity for the main problem of (2.10), in which py|xK ∈ WK(pxK) with probability 1.
We now give a direct coding theorem 3.4 and two converse theorems 3.5 and 3.7 pertaining to
the detect-all and the detect-one criteria, respectively. These theorems, combined with Lemma 3.2,
establish the capacity theorem 3.8.
Theorem 3.4 Under the continuity assumption (2.11), all fingerprinting code rates below
C˜all(D1,WK) and C˜
one(D1,WK) are achievable under the detect-all and the detect-one criteria,
respectively.
Theorem 3.4 is a direct consequence of Theorem 5.2(vi), stated and proved later in this paper.
Theorem 3.5 When WK is independent of pxK, no fingerprinting code rate R exceeding
C˜all(D1,WK) is achievable under the detect-all criterion. The same holds for the compound mem-
oryless class of (2.31).
Corollary 3.6 Under the continuity assumption (2.11), when WK depends on pxK, the following
holds. If the colluders are constrained to select a fair collusion channel, then WK(pxK) = W
fair
K (pxK),
and no rate above C˜all(D1,W
fair
K ) is achievable under the detect-all criterion.
The proof of Theorem 3.5 and Corollary 3.6 is given in Sec. 7.
Theorem 3.7 When WK is independent of pxK, no fingerprinting code rate R exceeding
C˜one(D1,W
fair
K ) = C˜
one(D1,WK) (3.11)
is achievable under the detect-one criterion. The same holds for the compound memoryless class
of (2.31).
The proof of Theorem 3.7 is given in Sec. 8.
Theorem 3.8 Consider fingerprinting for coalitions of size at most K. Let WK be the set of all
conditional distributions pY |XK (collusion attacks) that can be selected by the coalition.
(a) Detect-all case. Fingerprinting capacity is lower-bounded by C˜all(D1,WK) given by (3.9). If
in addition one of the following holds:
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(i) The set WK of attacks available to the coalition is independent of the joint type of the
fingerprints pxK assigned to the coalition; or
(ii) For every pxK, the set WK(pxK) of attacks given the joint type pxK contains only
permutation-invariant attacks (WK(pxK) = W
fair
K (pxK)),
then fingerprint capacity under the detect-all criterion is equal to C˜all(D1,WK).
(b) Detect-one case. Fingerprinting capacity is lower-bounded by C˜one(D1,WK) given by (3.8).
If in addition the set WK of attacks available to the coalition is independent of the joint type
of the fingerprints pxK assigned to the coalition, then
C˜one(D1,WK) = C˜
one(D1,W
fair
K ) = C˜
all(D1,W
fair
K ),
and fingerprint capacity under the detect-one criterion is equal to this common value.
The lower bounds on fingerprinting capacity derived in [4,5] are of the form (3.6) with L = 1, i.e.,
the auxiliary random variable W is degenerate. Since the payoff function IpS pKX|S pY |XK
(XK;Y |S)
is generally nonconcave with respect to pX|S, a randomized strategy in which the variable pX|S is
randomized will generally outperform a deterministic strategy in which pX|S is fixed. The auxiliary
random variable W plays the role of selector of pX|S in this mutual-information game.
Apparently the benefits of this randomization can be dramatic for large K. For the Boneh-Shaw
problem, the value of the maxmin of (3.6) with L = 1 is Cone1 (D1,WK) = K
−1 2−(K−1). However
Tardos’ scheme [9] uses W = [0, 1] and achieves a rate O(K−2) which is therefore much larger than
Cone1 (D1,WK) for large K. The rate of his code is necessarily a lower bound on C
one(D1,WK).
4 Simple Fingerprint Decoder
This section introduces our random coding scheme and a simple decoder that tests candidate fin-
gerprints one by one. This decoder is closely related to the correlation decoders that have been
used in Tardos’ paper [9] and in the signal processing literature. (Such decoders evaluate a measure
of correlation between the received sequence and the individual fingerprints, and retain the finger-
prints whose correlation score is above a certain threshold.) We derive error exponents for this
scheme and establish maximum rates for reliable decoding. These rates fall short of the fingerprint-
ing capacities Call(D1,WK) and C
one(D1,WK) given by Theorem 3.5 and 3.7. The derivations are
given for the case without side information (S = ∅) or distortion constraint (D1) for the fingerprint
distributor. This setup is directly applicable to the Boneh-Shaw model, and the derivations are
much easier to follow. This setup also contains several key ingredients of the error analysis for the
more elaborate joint fingerprint decoder of Sec. 5. In particular, the false-negative error exponents
are determined by the worst conditional type TyxK|w.
4.1 Codebook
The scheme is designed to achieve a false-positive error exponent equal to ∆ and assumes a nominal
value Knom for coalition size. (Reliable decoding will generally be possible for K > Knom though.)
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These parameters are used to identify a joint type class T ∗wx defined below (9.4). An arbitrarily
large L is selected, defining an alphabet W = {1, 2, · · · , L}. A random constant-composition code
C(w) = {xm, 1 ≤ m ≤ 2NR} is generated for each w ∈ T ∗w by drawing 2NR sequences independently
and uniformly from the conditional type class T ∗
x|w.
4.2 Encoding Scheme
A sequence W is drawn uniformly from the type class T ∗w and shared with the receiver. User m is
assigned codeword xm from C(W), for 1 ≤ m ≤ 2NR.
4.3 Decoding Scheme
The receiver makes an innocent/guilty decision on each user independently of the other users, and
there lies the simplicity but also the suboptimality of this decoder. Specifically, the estimated
coalition Kˆ is the collection of all m such that
I(xm;y|w) > R+∆. (4.1)
If no such Kˆ is found, the receiver outputs Kˆ = ∅. The users whose empirical mutual information
score exceeds the threshold R+∆ are declared guilty.
4.4 Error Exponents
Theorem 4.1 below gives the false-positive and false-negative error exponents for this coding scheme.
These exponents are given in terms of the functions defined below.
Define the set of conditional p.m.f.’s for XK given W whose conditional marginals are the same
for all components of XK:
M (pX|W ) = {pXK|W : pXm|W = pX|W , ∀m ∈ K}.
Denote by PXW (L) the set of p.m.f.’s pXW defined over X ×W. Define for each m ∈ K the set of
conditional p.m.f.’s
PY XK|W (pXW ,WK , R, L,m) ,
{
p˜Y XK|W : p˜XK|W ∈ M (pX|W ), p˜Y |XK ∈ WK(p˜XK),
Ip˜YX
K
|W pW (Xm;Y |W ) ≤ R
}
(4.2)
and the pseudo sphere packing exponent
E˜psp,m(R,L, pXW ,WK) = min
p˜YX
K
|W ∈PYX
K
|W (pXW ,WK ,R,L,m)
D(p˜Y XK|W‖p˜Y |XK pKX|W | pW ).(4.3)
The terminology pseudo sphere-packing exponent is used because despite its superficial resemblance
to a sphere-packing exponent [12], (4.3) does not provide a fundamental asymptotic lower bound
on error probability.
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Taking the maximum and minimum of E˜psp,m above over m ∈ K, we respectively define
E˜psp(R,L, pXW ,WK) = max
m∈K
E˜psp,m(R,L, pXW ,WK), (4.4)
E˜psp(R,L, pXW ,WK) = min
m∈K
E˜psp,m(R,L, pXW ,WK). (4.5)
If these expressions are evaluated for the set W fairK which is permutation invariant, then (4.2) and
(4.3) are independent of m ∈ K, and the expressions (4.4) and (4.5) coincide. Define
Epsp(R,L,WK) = max
pXW∈PXW (L)
E˜psp,1(R,L, pXW ,W
fair
Knom). (4.6)
Denote by p∗XW the maximizer in (4.6), which depends on R and W
fair
Knom
. Finally, define
Epsp(R,L,WK) = E˜psp(R,L, p
∗
XW ,WK), (4.7)
Epsp(R,L,WK) = E˜psp(R,L, p
∗
XW ,WK), (4.8)
where no fairness requirement is imposed on WK .
Theorem 4.1 The threshold decision rule (4.1) yields the following error exponents.
(i) The false-positive error exponent is
EFP(R,L,WK ,∆) = ∆. (4.9)
(ii) The detect-one error exponent is
Eone(R,L,WK ,∆) = Epsp(R+∆, L,WK). (4.10)
(iii) The detect-all error exponent is
Eall(R,L,WK ,∆) = Epsp(R+∆, L,WK). (4.11)
(iv) A fair collusion strategy is optimal under the detect-one error criterion: Eone(R,L,WK ,∆) =
Eone(R,L,W fairK ,∆).
(v) The detect-one and detect-all error exponents are the same when the colluders restrict their
choice to fair strategies: Eone(R,L,W fairK ,∆) = E
all(R,L,W fairK ,∆).
(vi) For K = Knom, the supremum of all rates for which the detect-one error exponent of (4.10)
is positive is given by
Csimple(WK) = C
simple(W fairK )
= lim
L→∞
max
pXW∈PXW (L)
min
pY |X
K
∈W fair
K
(pX
K
)
IpW pKX|W pY |XK
(X1;Y |W ) (4.12)
and is achieved by letting ∆→ 0 and L→∞.
Note. Applying (3.4) with S = ∅, we have I(X1;Y |W ) ≤ 1K I(XK;Y |W ) for any permutation-
invariant pY |XK . Since this inequality is generally strict, C
simple(WK) is generally lower than the
fingerprinting capacity Cone(WK) of (3.8). Hence the simple thresholding rule (4.1) is generally not
capacity-achieving.
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5 Joint Fingerprint Decoder
The encoder and joint decoder are presented in this section, and the performance of the new scheme
is analyzed. As in the previous section, the encoder ensures a false-positive error exponent ∆ and
assumes a nominal value Knom for coalition size. An arbitrarily large L is selected, defining an
alphabet W = {1, 2, · · · , L}. A random constant-composition code C(s,w) = {xm, 1 ≤ m ≤ 2NR}
is generated for each s ∈ SN and w ∈ T ∗w by drawing 2NR sequences independently and uniformly
from a conditional type class T ∗
x|sw. Both T
∗
w and T
∗
x|sw depend on ∆ and Knom as defined below
(10.6). Prior to encoding, a sequenceW ∈ WN is drawn independently of S and uniformly from T ∗w,
and shared with the receiver. Next, user m is assigned codeword xm ∈ C(S,W), for 1 ≤ m ≤ 2NR.
In terms of decoding, the fundamental improvement over the simple strategy of Sec. 4 resides in
the use of a joint decoding rule. Specifically, the decoder maximizes a penalized empirical mutual
information score over all possible coalitions of any size. The penalty is proportional to the size of
the coalition.
5.1 Mutual Information of k Random Variables
Our fingerprint decoding scheme is based on the notion of mutual information between k random
variables X1, · · · ,Xk. For k = 3, this mutual information is defined as [12, p. 57] [23, p. 378]
◦
I(X1;X2;X3) = H(X1) +H(X2) +H(X3)−H(X1,X2,X3).
We use the symbol
◦
I to distinguish it from the symbol I for standard mutual information between
two random variables. Note the chain rule
◦
I(X1;X2;X3) = I(X1;X2X3) + I(X2;X3).
The mutual information between k random variables X1, · · · ,Xk is similarly defined as the sum
of their individual entropies minus their joint entropy [12, p. 57] or equivalently, the divergence
between their joint distribution and the product of their marginals:
◦
I(X1; · · · ;Xk) = H(X1) + · · · +H(Xk)−H(X1, · · · ,Xk) (5.1)
= D(pX1···Xk‖pX1 · · · pXk).
Note the following properties, including the chain rules (P3) and (P4):
(P1) The mutual information (5.1) is symmetric in its arguments;
(P2)
◦
I(X1;X2) = I(X1;X2);
(P3)
◦
I(X1; · · · ;Xk) = I(X1;X2 · · ·Xk) +
◦
I(X2; · · · ;Xk) =
∑k−1
i=1 I(Xi;Xi+1 · · ·Xk);
(P4)
◦
I(X1; · · · ;Xk) =
◦
I(X1; · · · ;Xi;Xi+1 · · ·Xk) +
◦
I(Xi+1; · · · ;Xk) for any i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k − 2};
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(P5)
◦
I(X1; · · · ;Xk) =
∑k−1
i=1 H(Xi)−H(X1 · · ·Xk−1 |Xk).
Similarly to (5.1), we define the empirical mutual information
◦
I(x1; · · · ;xk) between k sequences
x1, · · · ,xk, as the mutual information with respect to the joint type of x1, · · · ,xk. Analogously to
Property (P5), we have
◦
I(x1; · · · ;xk;y) =
k∑
i=1
H(xi)−H(x1 · · · xk|y). (5.2)
This leads to the following alternative interpretation of the minimum-equivocation decoder of Liu
and Hughes [23]. If x1, · · · ,xk are codewords from a constant-composition code C, then H(xi) is
the same for all i, then the minimum-equivocation decoder is equivalent to a maximum-mutual-
information decoder:
min
x1···xk∈C
H(x1 · · ·xk|y) ⇔ max
x1···xk∈C
◦
I(x1; · · · ;xk;y). (5.3)
There is no similar interpretation when ordinary mutual information I(x1 · · ·xk;y) is used [23]. Liu
and Hughes showed that the minimum-equivocation decoder outperforms the ordinary maximum-
mutual-information decoder in terms of random-coding exponent.
5.2 MPMI Criterion
The restriction of xM to a subset A of M will be denoted by xA = {xm, m ∈ A}. For disjoint sets
A = {m1, · · · ,m|A|} and B = {m|A|+1, · · · ,m|A|+|B|}, we use the shorthand
◦
I(xA;yxB|sw) ,
◦
I(xm1 ; · · · ;xm|A| ;yxB|sw) (5.4)
for the mutual information between the |A| + 1 random variables xm1 , · · · ,xm|A| , and (y,xB),
conditioned on (s,w).
Define the function
MPMI(k) =

0 : if k = 0
max
xK∈Ck(s,w)
[◦
I(xK;y|sw) − k(R +∆)
]
: if k = 1, 2, · · · (5.5)
where k = |K| and◦
I(xK;y|sw) =
◦
I(x1; · · · ;xk;y|sw) = kH(x|sw)−H(xK|ysw) (5.6)
is the mutual information between the k+1 sequences x1, · · · ,xk,y, conditioned on (s,w), as defined
in (5.4). Again we stress that
◦
I(x1; · · · ;xk;y|sw) should not be confused with the ordinary mutual
information I(x1 · · ·xk;y|sw) between the k-tuple (x1, · · · ,xk) and y, conditioned on (s,w). Our
joint fingerprint decoder is a Maximum Penalized Mutual Information (MPMI) decoder:
max
k≥0
MPMI(k). (5.7)
In case of a tie, the largest value of k is retained. The decoder seeks the coalition size k and the
codewords {xm, m ∈ Kˆ} in C(s,w) that achieve the MPMI criterion above. The indices of these
codewords form the decoded coalition Kˆ. If the maximizing k in (5.7) is zero, the receiver outputs
Kˆ = ∅. Similarly to (5.3), the MPMI decoder may equivalently be interpreted as a Minimum
Penalized Equivocation criterion.
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5.3 Properties
The following lemma shows that 1) each subset of the estimated coalition is significant, and 2) any
extension of the estimated coalition would fail a significance test.
Lemma 5.1 Let Kˆ achieve the maximum in (5.5) (5.7). Then
∀A ⊆ Kˆ :
◦
I(xA;yxKˆ\A |sw) > |A|(R +∆). (5.8)
Moreover, for every A disjoint with Kˆ,
◦
I(xA;yxKˆ |sw) ≤ |A|(R +∆). (5.9)
Proof. For any A ⊆ Kˆ, we have
◦
I(xA;yxKˆ\A |sw)− |A| (R +∆)
(a)
= [
◦
I(xKˆ;y |sw)− Kˆ (R+∆)]− [
◦
I(xKˆ\A;y |sw)− (Kˆ − |A|) (R+∆)]
(b)
= MPMI(Kˆ)− [
◦
I(xKˆ\A;y |sw)− (Kˆ − |A|) (R +∆)]
≥ MPMI(Kˆ)−MPMI(Kˆ − |A|)
(c)
≥ 0
where (a) follows from the chain rule for
◦
I , (b) holds because Kˆ achieves the maximum in (5.5),
and (c) because Kˆ achieves the maximum in (5.7). This proves (5.8).
To prove (5.9), consider any A disjoint with Kˆ and let K′ = Kˆ ∪ A. We have
◦
I(xA;yxKˆ |sw)− |A| (R +∆)
(a)
= [
◦
I(xK′ ;y |sw)−K ′ (R+∆)]− [
◦
I(xKˆ;y |sw)− Kˆ (R+∆)]
(b)
= [
◦
I(xK′ ;y |sw)−K ′ (R+∆)]−MPMI(Kˆ)
≤ MPMI(K ′)−MPMI(Kˆ)
(c)
≤ 0,
where (a), (b), (c) are justified in the same way as above. This proves (5.9). ✷
Reliability metric. The score ◦
I(xKˆ;y |sw)− KˆR > Kˆ∆
represents a guilt index for the estimated coalition Kˆ. The larger this quantity is, the stronger the
evidence that the members of Kˆ are guilty. Likewise,
◦
I(xm;yxKˆ\{m} |sw)−R > ∆
is a guilt index for accused user m ∈ Kˆ, and
◦
I(xm;yxKˆ |sw)−R ≤ ∆
is a guilt index for user m /∈ Kˆ. The smaller this index is, the stronger the evidence that m is
innocent.
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5.4 Error Exponents
Theorem 5.2 below gives the false-positive and false-negative error exponents for our coding scheme.
These exponents are given in terms of the functions defined below.
Recall PXKW |S(pS , L,D1) defined in (3.5). We similarly define
PXK|SW (pSW , L,D1) ,
{
pXK|SW =
∏
k∈K
pXk|SW : pX1|SW = · · · = pXK |SW , Ed(S,X1) ≤ D1
}
.
Define now the following set of conditional p.m.f.’s for XK given S,W whose conditional marginal
p.m.f. pX|SW is the same for each Xm,m ∈ K:
M (pX|SW ) = {pXK|SW : pXm|SW = pX|SW , ∀m ∈ K}.
Define for each A ⊆ K the set of conditional p.m.f.’s
PY XK|SW (pW , p˜S|W , pX|SW ,WK , R, L,A)
,
{
p˜Y XK|SW : p˜XK|SW ∈ M (pX|SW ), p˜Y |XK ∈ WK(p˜XK),
1
|A|
◦
IpW p˜S|W p˜YXK|SW (XA;Y XK\A|S,W ) ≤ R
}
(5.10)
and the pseudo sphere packing exponent
E˜psp,A(R,L, pW , p˜S|W , pX|SW ,WK)
= min
p˜YX
K
|SW∈PY X
K
|SW (pW ,p˜S|W ,pX|SW ,WK ,R,L,A)
D(p˜Y XK|SW p˜S|W‖p˜Y |XK pKX|SW pS | pW ).(5.11)
Taking the maximum 3 and the minimum of E˜psp,A above over all subsets A ⊆ K, we define
E˜psp(R,L, pW , p˜S|W , pX|SW ,WK) = E˜psp,K(R,L, pW , p˜S|W , pX|SW ,WK), (5.12)
E˜psp(R,L, pW , p˜S|W , pX|SW ,WK) = min
A⊆K
E˜psp,A(R,L, pW , p˜S|W , pX|SW ,WK). (5.13)
Now define
Epsp(R,L,D1,WK) = max
pW∈PW
min
p˜S|W∈PS|W
max
pX|SW∈PX|SW (pW ,p˜S|W ,L,D1)
E˜psp,K(R,L, pW , p˜S|W , pX|SW ,W fairKnom). (5.14)
Denote by p∗W and p
∗
X|SW the maximizers in (5.14), where the latter is to be viewed as a function
of p˜S|W . Also note that both p∗W and p
∗
X|SW implicitly depend on R and W
fair
Knom
. Finally, define
Epsp(R,L,D1,WK) = min
p˜S|W∈PS|W
E˜psp(R,L, p
∗
W , p˜S|W , p
∗
X|SW ,WK), (5.15)
Epsp(R,L,D1,WK) = min
p˜S|W∈PS|W
E˜psp(R,L, p
∗
W , p˜S|W , p
∗
X|SW ,WK). (5.16)
3 The property that K achieves maxA⊆K E˜psp,A is derived in the proof of Theorem 5.2, Part (iv).
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Theorem 5.2 The decision rule (5.7) yields the following error exponents.
(i) The false-positive error exponent is
EFP(R,D1,WK ,∆) = ∆. (5.17)
(ii) The error exponent for the (false negative) probability that the decoder fails to catch all colluders
(misses some of them) is
Eall(R,L,D1,WK ,∆) = Epsp(R+∆, L,D1,WK). (5.18)
(iii) The error exponent for the (false negative) probability that the decoder fails to catch even one
colluder (misses every single colluder) is
Eone(R,L,D1,WK ,∆) = Epsp(R+∆, L,D1,WK). (5.19)
(iv) Eone(R,L,D1,WK ,∆) = E
one(R,L,D1,W
fair
K ,∆).
(v) Eall(R,L,D1,W
fair
K ,∆) = E
one(R,L,D1,W
fair
K ,∆).
(vi) If K = Knom, the supremum of all rates for which the error exponents of (5.18) and (5.19)
are positive are Call(D1,WK) and C
one(D1,WK) of (3.9) and (3.8), respectively.
Note. The expressions (5.18) and (5.19) for the false-negative error exponents may be viewed
as sequences indexed by L. As discussed below (3.7) and in [14, Sec. 3.5], one may show that these
sequences are nondecreasing and converge to finite limits at a polynomial rate.
6 Error Exponents for Memoryless Collusion Channels
Consider the compound class (2.31) of memoryless channels. The theorems of Sec. 3 showed that
compound capacity is the same as for the main problem of (2.10). We now outline how the derivation
of the error exponents.
Retracing the steps of the proof of Theorem 5.2, it may be seen that the expressions (5.17),
(5.18) and (5.19) for the error exponents remain valid, with two modifications. First, in (5.10), the
constraint p˜Y |XK ∈ WK is removed, and so the resulting set PmemorylessY XK|SW is larger than PY XK|SW of
(5.10). Second, the divergence cost function
D(p˜Y XK|SW p˜S|W‖p˜Y |XK pKX|SW pS | pW ) (6.1)
in the expression (5.11) for the pseudo sphere packing exponent E˜psp,A is replaced by
4
min
pY |X
K
∈WK
D(p˜Y XK|SW p˜S|W‖pY |XK pKX|SW pS | pW ); (6.2)
4 This can be traced back to (10.15), where py|xK is now replaced with pY |XK in the asymptotic expression for
the probability of the conditional type class TyxK|sw.
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denote by E˜memorylesspsp,A the corresponding pseudo sphere packing exponent.
The divergences in (6.1) and (6.2) coincide when pY |XK = p˜Y |XK, thus (6.2) is upper-bounded by
(6.1). Since pY |XK = p˜Y |XK is feasible for PY XK|SW of (5.10), we conclude that E˜
memoryless
psp,A ≤ E˜psp,A
of (5.11). Hence the false-negative error exponents in the memoryless case are upper-bounded by
those of Theorem 5.2. This phenomenon is similar to results in [14]: due to the use of RM codes,
the colluders’ optimal strategy is a nearly-memoryless strategy, but they are precluded from using
a truly memoryless strategy because that would violate the hard constraint py|xK ∈ WK . In the
memoryless case, the worst conditional type (which determines the false-negative error exponents)
might be such that py|xK /∈ WK .
7 Proof of Converse Under Detect-All Criterion
7.1 Proof of Theorem 3.5
The encoder generates marked copies xm = fN (s, v,m) for 1 ≤ m ≤ 2NR and the decoder outputs
an estimated coalition gN (y, s, v) ∈ {1, · · · , 2NR}⋆. By Lemma 3.3, it suffices to prove the claim for
the compound class of memoryless channels WK of (2.31). Let K be the size of the coalition and
(fN , gN ) a sequence of length-N , rate-R codes. We show that for any such sequence of codes, reliable
decoding of the fingerprints is possible only if R ≤ C˜all(D1,WK) under the detect-all criterion.
Step 1. A lower bound on error probability is obtained when a helper provides some information
to the decoder. Here the helper informs the decoder that the coalition size is K. There are(
2NR
K
)
≤ 2KNR possible coalitions of size K. We represent a coalition as MK , {M1, · · · ,MK},
where Mk, k ∈ K = {1, 2, · · · ,K}, are assumed to be drawn i.i.d. uniformly 5 from {1, · · · , 2NR}.
We similarly write Xk , xMk , k ∈ K, and XK , {X1, · · · ,XK}. The component of XK at position
t ∈ {1, · · · , N} is denoted by XK,t , {X1t, · · · ,XKt}. Assuming memoryless collusion channel
pY |XK ∈ WK is in effect, the joint p.m.f. of (MK,S, V,XK,Y) is given by
pMKSVXKY = p
N
S pV
∏
k∈K
(pMk 1{Xk = fN (S, V,Mk)}) pNY |XK . (7.1)
Define the random variables Qt = {V, Sj, j 6= t} ∈ VN×SN−1 for 1 ≤ t ≤ N . By assumption, St
and Qt are independent, and Xkt, k ∈ K, are conditionally i.i.d. given (St, Qt) = (S, V ). However,
note that Xkt, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, are generally conditionally dependent given (St, V ) alone. The joint
p.m.f. of (St, Qt,XK,t, Yt) is
pStpQt
 ∏
1≤k≤K
pXkt|StQt
 pY |XK , 1 ≤ t ≤ N (7.2)
where the conditional p.m.f. pXkt|StQt is the same for all k ∈ K. Now define a time-sharing random
variable T , uniformly distributed over {1, · · · , N}, and independent of the other random variables.
5 Capacity could be higher if there were constraints on the formation of coalitions, for instance if the users form
social networks [25].
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Let
XK , XK,T ∈ XK , Y , YT ∈ Y, S , ST ∈ S,
W , (QT , T ) ∈ W , VN × SN−1 × {1, · · · , N}. (7.3)
By (7.2) and (7.3), the code fN and the random variables S, V,MK induce an empirical p.m.f. pXK
which can be viewed as a function of fN . The joint p.m.f. of (S,W,XK, Y ) is
pS pW
(∏
k∈K
pXk|SW
)
pY |XK (7.4)
where the conditional p.m.f. pXk|SW is the same for all k ∈ K. Moreover
D1 ≥ E
[
1
N
N∑
t=1
d(St,Xkt)
]
= E d(S,Xk), k ∈ K.
Hence pXKW |S belongs to the set PXKW |S(pS, L,D1) of (3.5), with L = |W| = N × VN × |S|N .
Step 2. Our single-letter expressions are derived from the following inequality, which is valid
for all A ⊆ K and pY |XK ∈ WK :
I(MA;Y|S, V ) (a)= I(XA;Y|S, V )
= I(XA;Y|XK\A,S, V ) + I(XA;XK\A|S, V )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−I(XA;XK\A|Y,S, V )
(b)
≤ I(XA;Y|XK\A,S, V )
= H(Y|XK\A,S, V )−H(Y|XK,S, V )
(c)
= H(Y|XK\A,S, V )−H(Y|XK)
(d)
=
N∑
t=1
H(Yt|Y t−1,XK\A,S, V )−
N∑
t=1
H(Yt|XK,t)
(e)
≤
N∑
t=1
H(Yt|XK\A,t,S, V )−
N∑
t=1
H(Yt|XK,t)
(f)
=
N∑
t=1
H(Yt|XK\A,t, St, Qt)−
N∑
t=1
H(Yt|XK,t, St, Qt)
=
N∑
t=1
I(XA,t;Yt|XK\A,t, St, Qt)
= N I(XA;Y |XK\A, S,W ) (7.5)
where (a) is due to the data processing inequality and the fact that XA is a function of (MA,S, V ),
(b) holds because the codewords {Xk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K} are mutually independent given (S, V ), (c)
because (S, V )→ XK → Y forms a Markov chain, (d) is obtained using the chain rule for entropy
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and the fact that the collusion channel is memoryless, (e) holds because conditioning reduces
entropy, and (f) because (S, V ) = (St, Qt)→ XK,t → Yt forms a Markov chain.
Step 3. Under collusion channel pY |XK ∈ WK , let P alle (pY |XK) = Pr[Kˆ 6= K] be the decoding
error probability of the detect-all decoder. The following inequalities hold for every subset A of K
and for every pY |XK :
|A|NR (a)= H(MA) (b)= H(MA|S, V ) = H(MA|Y,S, V ) + I(MA;Y|S, V )
≤ H(MK|Y,S, V ) + I(MA;Y|S, V )
(c)
≤ 1 + P alle (pY |XK) ·KNR+ I(MA;Y|S, V ) (7.6)
where (a) holds because MA is uniformly distributed over {1, · · · , 2|A|NR}, (b) because MA and
(S, V ) are independent, and (c) because of Fano’s inequality.
For the error probability P alle (pY |XK) to vanish for each pY |XK ∈ WK , we need
R ≤ lim inf
N→∞
min
pY |X
K
∈WK
min
A⊆K
1
N |A|I(MA;Y|S, V ). (7.7)
We have
min
pY |XK∈WK
min
A⊆K
1
N |A|I(MA;Y|S, V )
(a)
≤ min
pY |X
K
∈WK
min
A⊆K
1
|A|I(XA;Y |XK\A, S,W )
(b)
≤ max
pX
K
W |S ∈PX
K
W |S(pS ,L(N),D1)
min
pY |X
K
∈WK
min
A⊆K
1
|A| I(XA;Y |XK\A, S,W )
≤ sup
L→∞
max
pX
K
W |S ∈PX
K
W |S(pS ,L,D1)
min
pY |X
K
∈WK
min
A⊆K
1
|A| I(XA;Y |XK\A, S,W )
(c)
≤ lim
L→∞
max
pX
K
W |S ∈PX
K
W |S(pS ,L,D1)
min
pY |X
K
∈WK
min
A⊆K
1
|A| I(XA;Y |XK\A, S,W ) (7.8)
where (a) is due to (7.5), (b) to the fact that pXKW |S given in (7.4) belongs to the set
PXKW |S(pS , L,D1) defined in (3.5), with L = L(N) = N × VN × |S|N , and (c) because the
supremand is nondecreasing in L.
Combining (7.7) and (7.8), we obtain
R ≤ lim
L→∞
max
pX
K
W |S∈PX
K
W |S(pS ,L,D1)
min
pY |X
K
∈WK (pXK )
min
A⊆K
1
|A| I(XA;Y |XK\A, S,W )
= lim
L→∞
CallL (D1,WK)
= C˜all(D1,WK) (7.9)
which concludes the proof of Theorem 3.5. ✷
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7.2 Proof of Corollary 3.6
By assumption, here the coalition is fair and WK = W
fair
K depends on the joint type pxK of the
colluders’ fingerprinted sequences. We denote this joint type by Z ∈ Z = P [N ]XK to make the
notation more compact. Note that Z is a function of (S, V,K) and that the cardinality of Z is at
most (N +1)|X |K . Since the channel pY |XK selected by the coalition may depend on Z, we indicate
this dependency explicitly by representing the channel as pY |XKZ and the set of feasible channels
as
W˜
fair
K = {pY |XKZ : pY |XK,Z=z ∈ W fairK (z), ∀z ∈ Z}. (7.10)
By Lemma 3.3, it suffices to prove the claim for the compound class of memoryless channels
W fairK (pxK).
Define the set
PXKWS(pS , L,D1) ,
{
pS pXKW |S : pXKW |S ∈ PXKW |S(pS, L,D1)
}
and slice it into the following disjoint collection of sets:
∀z ∈ Z : PXKWS(pS , L,D1, z) , {pXKWS ∈ PXKWS(pS , L,D1) : pXK = z} . (7.11)
The error probability of the decoder is not increased if a helper reveals the joint type Z. The
entropy of Z is at most log |Z| ≤ |X |K log(N+1). Fano’s inequality (7.6) applied to A = K becomes
KNR = H(MK|S, V )
≤ H(MK, Z|S, V )
= |X |K log(N + 1) +H(MK|S, V, Z)
≤ |X |K log(N + 1) + 1 + P alle (pY |XKZ) ·KNR+ I(MK;Y|S, V, Z). (7.12)
Analogously to (7.5), the following single-letter expression holds for every z ∈ Z and pY |XK ∈ WK(z):
I(MK;Y|S, V, Z = z) = I(XK;Y|S, V, Z = z)
= H(Y|S, V, Z = z)−H(Y|XK,S, V, Z = z)
(a)
= H(Y|S, V, Z = z)−H(Y|XK, Z = z)
(b)
=
N∑
t=1
H(Yt|Y t−1,S, V, Z = z)−
N∑
t=1
H(Yt|XK,t, Z = z)
≤
N∑
t=1
H(Yt|S, V, Z = z)−
N∑
t=1
H(Yt|XK,t, Z = z)
(c)
=
N∑
t=1
H(Yt|St, Qt, Z = z)−
N∑
t=1
H(Yt|XK,t, St, Qt, Z = z)
=
N∑
t=1
I(XK,t;Yt|St, Qt, Z = z)
= N I(XK;Y |S,W,Z = z) (7.13)
= NIpX
K
WS|Z=z pY |X
K
(XK;Y |S,W )
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where (a) holds because (S, V ) → (XK, Z) → Y forms a Markov chain, (b) because the collusion
channel remains memoryless even when conditioned on Z, and (c) because (S, V ) = (St, Qt) →
(XK, Z)→ Yt forms a Markov chain for each 1 ≤ t ≤ N .
For the error probability P alle (pY |XKZ) to vanish for each pY |XKZ ∈ W˜ fairK , we need
R
(a)
≤ lim inf
N→∞
min
pY |X
K
Z∈W˜ fairK
1
NK
I(MK;Y|S, V, Z)
(b)
≤ lim inf
N→∞
min
pY |X
K
Z∈W˜ fairK
1
K
IpSWXKZ pY |XKZ (XK;Y |S,W,Z)
≤ lim
N→∞
max
pZ∈PZ
max
{pX
K
WS|Z=z∈PXKWS(pS ,L(N),D1,z)}z∈Z
min
{pY |X
K
∈W fair
K
(z)}z∈Z
1
K
∑
z∈Z
pZ(z) IpX
K
WS|Z=z pY |X
K
(XK;Y |S,W )
(c)
= lim
N→∞
max
z∈Z
max
pX
K
WS|Z=z∈PXKWS(pS ,L(N),D1,z)
min
pY |X
K
∈W fair
K
(z)
1
K
IpX
K
WS|Z=z pY |X
K
(XK;Y |S,W )
= lim
N→∞
max
pX
K
WS∈PX
K
WS(pS ,L(N),D1)
min
pY |X
K
∈W fair
K
(pXK )
1
K
IpXKWS pY |XK
(XK;Y |S,W )
≤ lim
L→∞
max
pX
K
WS∈PX
K
WS(pS ,L,D1)
min
pY |X
K
∈W fair
K
(pXK )
1
K
I(XK;Y |S,W )
= lim
L→∞
max
pX
K
W |S∈PX
K
W |S(pS ,L,D1)
min
pY |XK∈W fairK (pXK )
1
K
I(XK;Y |S,W )
= C˜all(D1,W
fair
K ) (7.14)
where (a) follows from (7.12), (b) from (7.13), and (c) from the fact that in a game in which Z is a
variable chosen by the first player (here the embedder) but known to all players (embedder, collud-
ers, receiver), there can be no advantage in randomizing Z, i.e., a deterministic choice of Z suffices
to achieve the value of the maxmin game. More formally, equality (c) is a direct consequence of
the following simple lemma, using the fingerprint distributor’s feasible set PXKWS(pS , L(N),D1, z)
in place of F(z), the colluders’ feasible set W fairK (z) in place of G(z), and the conditional mutual
information I(XK;Y |S,W ) as the payoff function φ. This concludes the proof. ✷
Lemma 7.1 Consider a discrete set Z and two families of sets F(z), z ∈ Z and G(z), z ∈ Z
indexed by the elements of Z. Then the following game with payoff function φ:
V = max
p∈PZ
max
{fz∈F(z)}z∈Z
min
{gz∈G(z)}z∈Z
∑
z∈Z
p(z)φ(fz , gz) (7.15)
admits a pure-strategy solution, i.e., the maximum over the p.m.f. p ∈ PZ is achieved by deter-
ministic p.
Proof: Write f = {fz}z∈Z and g = {gz}z∈Z where each fz ∈ F(z) and gz ∈ G(z). For each
(p, f), let g∗(p, f) achieve the minimum over g of the function
∑
z∈Z p(z)φ(fz, gz). For each p,
let f∗(p) achieve the maximum over f of the function
∑
z∈Z p(z)φ(fz , g
∗
z(p, f)). By inspection of
(7.15), the following elementary properties hold for each p ∈ PZ and z ∈ Z:
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• The minimizing g∗z depends on (p, f) via fz only, and we denote this limited dependency
explicitly by g∗z (fz). The minimizer satisfies
φ(fz, g
∗
z(fz)) = min
gz∈G(z)
φ(fz, gz). (7.16)
• The maximizing f∗z does not depend on p and satisfies
φ(f∗z , g
∗
z(f
∗
z )) = max
fz∈F(z)
min
gz∈G(z)
φ(fz, gz). (7.17)
Substituting (7.17) into (7.15), we obtain
V = max
p∈PZ
∑
z∈Z
p(z)φ(f∗z , g
∗
z(f
∗
z ))
= max
z∈Z
φ(f∗z , g
∗
z (f
∗
z ))
= max
z∈Z
max
fz∈F(z)
min
gz∈G(z)
φ(fz, gz)
which proves the claim. ✷
8 Proof of Theorem 3.7: Converse Under Detect-One Criterion
By Lemma 3.3, it suffices to prove the claim for the compound class of memoryless channels WK .
Let MN = {1, 2, · · · , 2NR}. For notational simplicity, assume two colluders (K = 2). The proof
extends straightforwardly to larger coalitions. For the detect-one criterion, it is sufficient to consider
decoding rules that return exactly one user index, i.e., the decoding rule is a mapping
gN : YN × SN × VN →MN . (8.1)
Indeed, consider momentarily a more general decoder that returns a list of accused users. By
definition of the detect-one and false-positive error criteria, correct decoding occurs if and only if
the list size L ≥ 1 and all users on the output list are guilty. One can then construct a new decoder
of the form (8.1) that returns an arbitrary user if L = 0 and an arbitrary element of the original
size-L list if L ≥ 1. The correct-decoding event for the original decoder is also a correct-decoding
event for the new decoder, and so the new decoder has at least the same probability of correct
decoding as the original decoder. 6 In the following, we only consider decoding rules of the form
(8.1).
Denote by Di(s, v) the decoding region for user i, i.e.,
y ∈ Di(s, v) ⇔ gN (y, s, v) = i, ∀i ∈ MN .
6 The new decoder performs better than the original one in the event that the list has size L ≥ 2 and consists of
a mix of guilty and innocent users (an error is then declared for the original decoder), and the list member selected
by new decoder is guilty (a correct decision is made).
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The decoding regions form a partition of YN . The average probability of correct decoding is given
by
Pc(fN , gN , pY |X1X2)
= Pr[gN (Y,S, V ) ∈ K]
=
1
22NR
∑
i,j∈MN
∑
s∈SN
pNS (s)
∑
v∈VN
pV (v)
∑
y∈Di(s,v)∪Dj(s,v)
pNY |X1X2(y|xi(s, v),xj(s, v)). (8.2)
Without loss of optimality we assume that randomly modulated codes (Def. 2.2, Prop. 2.2) are
used.
The proof is organized along thirteen steps. An arbitrarily small parameter δ > 0 is chosen.
Step 1 defines for each (s, v) a set of bad codewords that have exponentially many neighbors within
Hamming balls of radius Nδ centered at these codewords. The remaining codewords constitute
the so-called good set. Step 2 introduces a dense, nested family W fairK,δ of subsets of W
fair
K indexed
by δ and consisting of “nice channels”. An equivalence is given between Hamming distance of two
codewords and statistical distinguishability of the output of any pY |X1X2 ∈ W fairK,δ . For clarity of
the exposition we initially derive error probabilities assuming that the good set is large and that
both colluders are assigned codewords in the good set; these assumptions are subsequently relaxed
in Steps 10 and 11. All the error probabilities up to that point are conditioned on S, V . Step 3
introduces the basic random variables used in the proof. Step 4 does (a) define a reference product
conditional p.m.f for Y given S, V ; (b) associate a conditional self-information to each pair of
codewords; and (c) define a large set of codeword pairs whose conditional self-information is within
δ2 of their average value. Step 5 defines a typical set for Y given S, V , and K. Step 6 shows that
typical sets for good codeword pairs have weak overlap. Step 7 defines a collection of refined typical
sets for Y with bounded overlap. Step 8 defines a typical set for the host sequence S. Step 9 upper
bounds the conditional probability of correct decoding in terms of a mutual information. Step 10
derives an analogous result conditioned on the event that both colluders are assigned codewords
from the bad set. Step 11 combines the bounds for good and bad codewords into a single bound.
Step 12 removes the conditioning on S, V and upper bounds the unconditional probability of correct
decoding (8.2) in terms of a mutual information. Step 13 derives an upper bound on that mutual
information and shows that any achievable rate R must be less than half of the upper bound. The
proof is completed by letting δ ↓ 0.
Step 1. Denote by
dH(x,x
′) =
N∑
t=1
1{xt 6= x′t}
the Hamming distance between two sequences x and x′ in XN , and by
Mj(s, v, δ) = {k ∈ MN : dH(xj(s, v),xk(s, v)) ≤ Nδ},
j ∈ MN , s ∈ SN , v ∈ VN , 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 (8.3)
the set of indices k for the codewords xk(s, v) that are within Hamming distance Nδ of codeword
xj(s, v), and by Mj(s, v, δ) = |Mj(s, v, δ)| the cardinality of this set. The function Mj(s, v, ·)− 1 is
akin to a cumulative distance distribution. It is nondecreasing, withM(s, v, 0) ≥ 1 andM(s, v, 1) =
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2NR. Note that for S = ∅ and random codes over X = {0, 1}, Mj(V, δ) − 1 is a random variable
whose expectation vanishes as N → ∞ for δ < δGV (R), the Gilbert-Varshamov distance at rate
R [24].
Denote by
MgoodN (s, v, δ) = {j ∈ MN : |Mj(s, v, δ)| ≤ 2N3
√
δ}, v ∈ VN , 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 (8.4)
a set of “good” indices j (there are at most 2N3
√
δ codewords within Hamming distance Nδ of
codeword xj(s, v)), and by
MbadN (s, v, δ) = MN \MgoodN (s, v, δ)
= {j ∈MN : |Mj(s, v, δ)| > 2N3
√
δ} (8.5)
the complementary set of “bad” indices.
Note that any code with normalized minimum distance δmin > 0 satifies Mj(s, v, δ) ≡ 1 and
thus MgoodN (s, v, δ) ≡MN for all 0 < δ < δmin. However the derivations in Steps 2—8 of the proof
make no assumption on the size of the sets MgoodN (s, v, δ). Finally, for the RM codes considered
here, the sets (8.3), (8.4), and (8.5) depend on the host sequence s only via its type ps.
Step 2. Channels pY |X1X2 that satisfy pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2) = 0 for some y, x1, x2 or
pY |X1X2(·|x1, x2) ≡ pY |X1X2(·|x′1, x′2) for some (x1, x2) 6= (x′1, x′2) require special handling. To
this end, we define the following nested family of subsets of W fairK , indexed by 0 < δ ≤ 1/|Y|:
W
fair
K,δ =
{
pY |X1X2 ∈ W fairK : pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2) ≥ δ, ∀y, x1, x2,,
δ ≤ D(pY |X1=x1,X2=x2‖pY |X1=x′1,X2=x′2) ≤ log δ−1, ∀(x1, x2) 6= (x′1, x′2)
}
(8.6)
where the upper bound on divergence is implied by the lower bound on pY |X1X2 . By continuity of
the correct-decoding probability functional (8.2) and by the definition (8.6), we have
C˜one(D1,W
fair
K,δ ) ↓ C˜one(D1,W fairK ) as δ ↓ 0.
Denote by
Dijk ,
1
N
N∑
t=1
D(pY |X1=xit(s,v),X2=xjt(s,v)‖pY |X1=xit(s,v),X2=xkt(s,v)) (8.7)
the normalized conditional Kullback-Leibler divergence (given s, v) between the distributions on
Y induced by codeword pairs (i, j) and (i, k), respectively. It follows from (8.6) that for each
pY |X1X2 ∈ W fairK,δ ,
dH(xj(s, v),xk(s, v)) ≤ Nδ ⇒ Dijk ≤ δ log δ−1. (8.8)
and
dH(xj(s, v),xk(s, v)) > Nδ ⇒ Dijk > δ2
Conversely,
Dijk ≤ δ2 ⇒ dH(xj(s, v),xk(s, v)) ≤ Nδ. (8.9)
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When Dijk is small, we say that the codewords xj(s, v) and xk(s, v) are nearly indistinguishable
at the channel output. For any (s, v, i, j, k) and pY |X1X2 ∈ W fairK,δ , (8.8) and (8.9) describe an
equivalence between statistical distinguishability of two codewords and Hamming distance.
Step 3. To analyze the probability of correct decoding conditioned on the event K ∈
(MgoodN (S, V, δ))2 that both colluders are assigned good codewords, we define the following random
variables. Define Qt = {V, Sj , j 6= t} over the alphabetQN , VN×SN−1. We have (St, Qt) = (S, V )
for each 1 ≤ t ≤ N . Since the host sequence type ps together with any qt, 1 ≤ t ≤ N , uniquely
determines st and thus the pair (s, v) (and vice-versa), we may also use (ps, q) as an equivalent
representation of the pair (s, v). Define a time-sharing random variable T uniformly distributed
over {1, 2, · · · , N} and independent of the other random variables. Let
S = ST , Q = QT , Y = YT , and Xi = xi,T (S, V ), ∀i ∈ MN .
Define the random variable X drawn uniformly from {Xi, i ∈ MgoodN (S, V, δ)}. The conditional
p.m.f of X given S, V, T is given by
pX|SV T (x|s, v, t) =
1
|MgoodN (s, v, δ)|
∑
i∈Mgood
N
(s,v,δ)
1{xit(s, v) = x}, ∀x, s, v, t. (8.10)
Given s, v, t, the conditional distribution of (Xi,Xj , Y ) is pXiXj |S=s,V=v,T=t pY |X1X2 where
pXiXj |SV T (x1, x2|s, v, t) = 1{xit(s, v) = x1, xjt(s, v) = x2},
x1, x2 ∈ X , i, j ∈ MgoodN (s, v, δ), 1 ≤ t ≤ N. (8.11)
By (8.10), the average of (8.11) over i, j ∈MgoodN (s, v, δ) is the product conditional p.m.f
1
|MgoodN (s, v, δ)|2
∑
i,j∈Mgood
N
(s,v,δ)
pXiXj |SV T (x1, x2|s, v, t)
= pX|SV T (x1|s, v, t) pX|SV T (x2|s, v, t). (8.12)
Step 4. The conditional distribution of each Yt, 1 ≤ t ≤ N , given (S, V ) and K ∈
(MgoodN (S, V, δ))2, is given by
pYt|SV (y|s, v) = pY |SV T (y|s, v, t)
=
1
|MgoodN (s, v, δ)|2
∑
i,j∈Mgood
N
(s,v,δ)
pY |X1X2(y|xit(s, v), xjt(s, v)) (8.13)
=
1
|MgoodN (s, v, δ)|2
∑
i,j∈Mgood
N
(s,v,δ)
∑
x1,x2∈X
pXiXj |SV T (x1, x2|s, v, t) pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2)
=
∑
x1,x2∈X
pX|SV T (x1|s, v, t) pX|SV T (x2|s, v, t) pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2). (8.14)
For any permutation π of {1, 2, · · · , N} we have pYpi(t)|SV (y|π(s), v) = pYt|SV (y|s, v) for all RM
codes. The product conditional distribution
r(y|s, v) ,
N∏
t=1
pYt|SV (yt|s, v) (8.15)
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is strongly exchangeable for each v ∈ VN and will be used as a reference conditional p.m.f for Y
given S, V in the sequel. We also define the following conditional self-informations (i.e., mutual
information for coalition (i, j) averaged over Yt (resp. Y) and conditioned on S, V ):
θij,t(s, v) ,
∑
yt∈Y
pY |X1X2(yt|xit(s, v), xjt(s, v)) log
pY |X1X2(yt|xit(s, v), xjt(s, v))
pYt|SV (yt|s, v)
,
= D(pY |X1=xit(s,v),X2=xjt(s,v)‖pYt|S=s,V=v) (8.16)
θij(s, v) ,
1
N
N∑
t=1
θij,t(s, v)
=
1
N
N∑
t=1
∑
yt∈Y
pY |X1X2(yt|xit(s, v), xjt(s, v)) log
pY |X1X2(yt|xit(s, v), xjt(s, v))
pYt|SV (yt|s, v)
=
1
N
N∑
t=1
∑
x1,x2,y
1{xit(s, v) = x1, xjt(s, v) = x2} pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2) log
pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2)
pYt|SV (y|s, v)
=
∑
t,x1,x2,y
pT (t) pXiXj |SV T (x1, x2|s, v, t) pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2) log
pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2)
pY |SV T (y|s, v, t)
. (8.17)
Since pY |X1X2 is symmetric, the expressions (8.16) and (8.17) are symmetric in i and j. The average
of θij(s, v) over all (i, j) ∈ (MgoodN (s, v, δ))2 is the conditional mutual information
I(s, v) ,
1
|MgoodN (s, v, δ)|2
∑
i,j∈Mgood
N
(s,v,δ)
θij(s, v) (8.18)
=
∑
t,x1,x2,y
pT (t) pX|SV T (x1|s, v, t) pX|SV T (x2|s, v, t) pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2) log
pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2)
pY |SV T (y|s, v, t)
= IpT p2X|SV T pY |X1X2
(X1X2;Y |S = s, V = v, T ). (8.19)
For RM codes, both θij(s, v) and I(s, v) depend on s only via its type ps.
Since the average value of θij(s, v) is I(s, v), there may not be too many pairs (i, j) for which
θij(s, v) is well above the mean. More precisely, there exists a symmetric subset A˜(s, v, δ) ⊆
(MgoodN (s, v, δ))2 of size
|A˜(s, v, δ)| ≥ δ
2
δ2 + I(s, v)
|MgoodN (s, v, δ)|2 ≥
δ2
δ2 + log |Y| |M
good
N (s, v, δ)|2
such that A˜(s, v, δ) depends on s only via ps and
(i, j) ∈ A˜(s, v, δ) ⇒ θij(s, v) ≤ I(s, v) + δ2. (8.20)
This claim is seen to hold by contrapositive. If there existed a subset A˜c(s, v, δ) of size
I(s,v)
δ2+I(s,v)
|MgoodN (s, v, δ)|2 or larger such that
∀(i, j) ∈ A˜c(s, v, δ) : θij(s, v) > I(s, v) + δ2
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we would have ∑
i,j∈MN
θij(s, v) > (I(s, v) + δ
2) |A˜c(s, v, δ)| ≥ |MgoodN (s, v, δ)|2I(s, v)
which would contradict (8.18). 7
Moreover, the interval [0, log |Y|] is covered by the finite collection of intervals
Θl ,
[
l
δ2
2
, (l + 1)
δ2
2
)
, l = 0, 1, · · · ,
⌊
2 log |Y|
δ2
⌋
, lmax
of width δ2/2, and at least one of these intervals must contain many θij(s, v). Specifically, for some
integer 0 ≤ l < lmax there must exist a subset A(s, v, δ) ⊆ A˜(s, v, δ) with the following properties:
(i, j) ∈ A(s, v, δ) ⇒ θij(s, v) ∈ Θl
⇒ |θij(s, v) − I(s, v)| ≤ δ
2
4
, (8.21)
I(s, v) ,
(
l +
1
2
)
δ2
2
≤ I(s, v) ≤ log |Y|, (8.22)
A(s, v, δ) is symmetric with size at least equal to
|A(s, v, δ)| ≥ δ
2
2 log |Y| |A˜(s, v, δ)| ≥
δ4
2 log |Y| (δ2 + log |Y|) |M
good
N (s, v, δ)|2
≥ δ
4
4 log2 |Y| |M
good
N (s, v, δ)|2, (8.23)
and A(s, v, δ) depends on s only via ps.
To summarize, the subset A(s, v, δ) ⊆ (MgoodN (s, v, δ))2 has size nearly equal to |MgoodN (s, v, δ)|2
and consists of the indices of the codeword pairs whose conditional self-information θij(s, v) is close
to some I(s, v) ≤ I(s, v).
Recalling (8.19) and the equivalence of the representations (S, V ) and (S,Q), we define
I(p′S , q) , IpT p′Sp2X|SQTpY |X1X2 (X1,X2;Y |S,Q = q, T ) ∀p
′
S ∈ PS , q ∈ QN (8.24)
which is a linear functional of p′S and coincides with I(s, v) in (8.19) when p
′
S = ps.
Step 5. Define the following subset of YN :
T˜δ(s, v, i, j) ,
{
y ∈ YN :
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
t=1
log
pY |X1X2(yt|xit(s, v), xjt(s, v))
pYt|SV (yt|s, v)
− θij(s, v)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ28
}
(8.25)
which satisfies the symmetry property T˜δ(s, v, i, j) = T˜δ(s, v, j, i) and the letter permutation-
invariance property (for RM codes)
y ∈ T˜δ(s, v, i, j) ⇒ π(y) ∈ T˜δ(π(s), v, i, j)
7 As mentioned by a reviewer, the claim could alternatively be proven by application of Markov’s inequality.
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for any permutation π of {1, 2, · · · , N}.
We show that T˜δ(s, v, i, j) is a typical set for Y conditioned on S = s, V = v, and K = {i, j},
in the following sense:
Pr[Y /∈ T˜δ(s, v, i, j)|S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}] ≤ 64 log
2 δ
Nδ4
, ∀s, v, i, j (8.26)
vanishes as N →∞. Indeed we may rewrite (8.26) as
Pr[Y /∈ T˜δ(s, v, i, j)|S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}]
= Pr
[
|θˆij(s, v) − θij(s, v)| ≥ δ
2
8
∣∣∣∣S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}] (8.27)
where
θˆij(s, v) ,
1
N
N∑
t=1
log
pY |X1X2(Yt|xit(s, v), xjt(s, v))
pYt|SV (Yt|s, v)
. (8.28)
Since Yt, 1 ≤ t ≤ N , are conditionally independent given S, V,K, θˆij(s, v) is the average of N
random variables that are conditionally independent given S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}. Recalling
(8.16), the conditional expectation of these random variables is given by
EYt|SVK
[
log
pY |X1X2(Yt|xit(s, v), xjt(s, v)
pYt|SV (Yt|s, v)
]
= θij,t(s, v), 1 ≤ t ≤ N, (8.29)
and averaging (8.29) over t yields EY|SVK(θˆij(s, v)) = θij(s, v). The conditional variances of these
random variables are
ζt(s, v, i, j) , varYt|SVK
[
log
pY |X1X2(Yt|xit(s, v), xjt(s, v)
pYt|SV (Yt|s, v)
]
, 1 ≤ t ≤ N. (8.30)
By our assumption (8.6) that pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2) ≥ δ for every y, x1, x2, the argument of the log
above is in the range [1/δ, δ]. Hence ζt(s, v, i, j) ≤ log2 δ, and
varY|SVK(θˆij(s, v)) =
1
N2
N∑
t=1
ζt(s, v, i, j) ≤ log
2 δ
N
.
By Chebyshev’s inequality, the probability of (8.27) is upper-bounded by
EY|SVK[(θˆij(s, v) − θij(s, v))2]
(δ2/8)2
=
varY|SVK(θˆij(s, v))
(δ2/8)2
≤ 64 log
2 δ
Nδ4
which establishes (8.26).
Step 6. Define the following subsets of MgoodN (s, v, δ), indexed by i ∈ MgoodN (s, v, δ):
MA−goodN (s, v, i, δ) , {j ∈MgoodN (s, v, δ) : (i, j) ∈ A(s, v, δ)} (8.31)
which depend on s only via ps.
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We show that the typical sets T˜δ(s, v, i, j), j ∈ MA−goodN (s, v, i, δ), have weak overlap for any
fixed s, v, i. Define the overlap factor of the good sets at Y = y:
Mδ(y, s, v, i) ,
∑
k∈MA−good
N
(s,v,i,δ)
1{y ∈ T˜δ(s, v, i, k)}. (8.32)
We show there exists δ∗ > 0 such that
Pr[Mδ(Y, s, v, i) > 2
N3
√
δ | S = s, V = v,K = {i, j},Y ∈ T˜δ(s, v, i, j)] < 1
N
∀N > δ−8, δ < δ∗. (8.33)
To do so, define the normalized loglikelihood ratio
Dˆijk(Y) =
1
N
log
pNY |X1X2(Y|xi(s, v),xj(s, v))
pNY |X1X2(Y|xi(s, v),xk(s, v))
. (8.34)
If Y ∈ T˜δ(s, v, i, j) ∩ T˜δ(s, v, i, k) for some j, k ∈MA−goodN (s, v, i, δ), then
Dˆijk(Y) ≤ |Dˆijk(Y)|
(a)
≤ |θij(s, v) − θik(s, v)| + 2× δ
2
8
(b)
≤ 3δ
2
4
(8.35)
where inequality (a) follows from (8.25) and (b) from (8.21) and the fact that both (i, j) and (i, k)
are in A(s, v, δ).
If j ∈ MA−goodN (s, v, i, δ) and Y ∈ T˜δ(s, v, i, j), it follows from (8.32) and (8.35) that
Mδ(Y, s, v, i) =
∑
k∈MA−good
N
(s,v,i,δ)
1{Y ∈ T˜δ(s, v, i, j) ∩ T˜δ(s, v, i, k)}
≤ ζˆ(Y)1{Y ∈ T˜δ(s, v, i, j)} (8.36)
where we have defined the random variable
ζˆ(Y) ,
∑
k∈MA−good
N
(s,v,i,δ)
1
{
Dˆijk(Y) ≤ 3δ
2
4
}
. (8.37)
Now recalling the definition of the normalized divergence Dijk in (8.7), define
ζ ,
∑
k∈MA−good
N
(s,v,i,δ)
1{Dijk ≤ δ2}
(a)
≤
∑
k∈MA−good
N
(s,v,i,δ)
1{dH(xj(s, v),xk(s, v)) ≤ Nδ}
≤
∑
k∈MN
1{dH(xj(s, v),xk(s, v)) ≤ Nδ}
(b)
= |Mj(s, v, δ)|
(c)
≤ 2N3
√
δ (8.38)
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where inequality (a) follows from (8.9), (b) from (8.3), and (c) from (8.4).
In Appendix C, we show that ζˆ(Y) ≤ ζ with probability approaching 1 as N → ∞, and more
specifically,
Pr[ζˆ(Y) > ζ | S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}] < |X |3 |Y| (N + 1)|X |3 2−Nδ7 (8.39)
for all δ smaller than some δ∗∗ > 0. Then there exists some δ∗ ∈ (0, δ∗∗) such that
Pr[Mδ(Y, s, v, i) > 2
N3
√
δ | S = s, V = v,K = {i, j},Y ∈ T˜δ(s, v, i, j)]
(a)
≤ Pr[ζˆ(Y) > 2N3
√
δ | S = s, V = v,K = {i, j},Y ∈ T˜δ(s, v, i, j)]
≤ Pr[ζˆ(Y) > 2
N3
√
δ | S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}
Pr[Y ∈ T˜δ(s, v, i, j) | S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}]
(b)
≤ Pr[ζˆ(Y) > 2
N3
√
δ | S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}
1− 64 log2 δ
Nδ4
(c)
≤ Pr[ζˆ(Y) > ζ | S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}
1− 64 log2 δ
Nδ4
(d)
<
1
N
∀N > δ−8, δ < δ∗
where (a) follows from (8.36), (b) from (8.26), (c) from (8.38), and (d) from (8.39). This establishes
(8.33).
Step 7. We now prune the typical sets T˜δ(s, v, i, j) to exclude the points y that lie within more
than 2N3
√
δ of the typical sets. For each s, v, i, j, define the pruned typical set
Tδ(s, v, i, j) , {y ∈ T˜δ(s, v, i, j) : Mδ(y, s, v, i) ≤ 2N3
√
δ}. (8.40)
It follows from (8.40) and (8.32) that
∀y, s, v, i :
∑
j∈MA−good
N
(s,v,i,δ)
1{y ∈ Tδ(s, v, i, j)} = Mδ(y, s, v, i)
≤ 2N3
√
δ. (8.41)
The pruned set Tδ(s, v, i, j) is still typical for Y conditioned on S = s, V = v, and K = {i, j}
because
Pr[Y /∈ Tδ(s, v, i, j)|S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}]
(a)
= Pr[Y /∈ T˜δ(s, v, i, j)|S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}]
+Pr[Mδ(Y, s, v, i) > 2
N3
√
δ | Y ∈ T˜δ(s, v, i, j),S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}]
(b)
≤ 64 log
2 δ
Nδ4
+
1
N
(c)
≤ 72 log
2 δ
Nδ4
, ∀s, v, i, j, N > δ−8, δ < δ∗ (8.42)
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where (a) follows from the definition (8.40), (b) from the inequalities (8.26) and (8.33), and (c)
holds because δ < 12 .
Step 8. Define the typical set for S in the variational-distance sense:
Tδ , {s : dV (ps, pS) ≤ δ}. (8.43)
We have the inequality
Pr[S /∈ Tδ] =
∑
Ts : dV (ps,pS)>δ
PNS (Ts)
(a)
≤
∑
ps : dV (ps,pS)>δ
2−ND(ps‖pS)
(b)
≤ (N + 1)|S| max
ps : dV (ps,pS)>δ
2−ND(ps‖pS)
(c)
≤ (N + 1)|S| max
ps : D(ps‖pS)>δ2/ ln 4
2−ND(ps‖pS)
≤ (N + 1)|S| 2−Nδ2/ ln 4 (8.44)
where in (a) we have used the upper bound of [12, p. 32] on the probability of a type class, in (b)
the fact that the number of type classes Ts is at most (N + 1)
|S| [12, p. 29] and in (c) Pinsker’s
inequality D(p‖q) ≥ d2V (p, q)/ ln 4 [12, p. 58].
Applying successively (8.24) and (8.43), we have
|I(ps, q)− I(pS , q)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
s∈S
(ps(s)− pS(s)) I(X1,X2;Y |S = s,Q = q, T )
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ δ max
s∈S
I(X1,X2;Y |S = s,Q = q, T )
≤ δ log |Y|, ∀s ∈ Tδ, q ∈ QN . (8.45)
Step 9. Given fN , gN , pY |X1,X2 , s, v, we will be interested in several conditional probabilities
that correct decoding occurs in conjunction with the typical event Y ∈ Tδ(s, v,K). Define the
following short hands:
P c(i, j|s, v) = Pr[correct decoding and Y ∈ Tδ(s, v, i, j) |S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}]
=
∑
y∈Tδ(s,v,i,j)∩(Di(s,v)∪Dj(s,v))
pNY |X1X2(y|xi(s, v),xj(s, v)), (8.46)
P goodc (s, v) = Pr[correct decoding and Y ∈ Tδ(s, v,K) |S = s, V = v,K ∈ (MgoodN (s, v, δ))2 ]
=
1
|MgoodN (s, v, δ)|2
∑
i,j∈Mgood
N
(s,v,δ)
P c(i, j|s, v). (8.47)
Note that P c(i, j|s, v) depends on s only via its type ps (because RM codes are used).
41
The conditional probability of correct decoding given (s, v) and the event that both colluders
are assigned good codewords is
P goodc (s, v) = Pr[correct decoding |S = s, V = v,K ∈ (MgoodN (s, v, δ))2]
(a)
≤ P goodc (s, v) + Pr[Y /∈ Tδ(s, v,K) |S = s, V = v,K ∈ (MgoodN (s, v, δ))2 ]
(b)
≤ P goodc (s, v) +
72 log2 δ
Nδ4
, ∀N > δ−8, δ < δ∗ (8.48)
where (a) and (b) follow from (8.47) and (8.42), respectively. For any subset B ⊆ (MgoodN (s, v, δ))2 ,
possibly dependent on s, v, we also define
P c(B|s, v) ,
1
|B|
∑
(i,j)∈B
P c(i, j|s, v). (8.49)
Combining (8.47) and (8.49), we have
P goodc (s, v) =
|B|
|MgoodN (s, v, δ)|2
P c(B|s, v) +
(
1− |B|
|MgoodN (s, v, δ)|2
)
P c((MgoodN (s, v, δ))2 \ B|s, v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
≤ 1− |B|
|MgoodN (s, v, δ)|2
(1− P c(B|s, v)). (8.50)
Applying this inequality to B = A(s, v, δ) and using the cardinality bound (8.23) yields
P goodc (s, v) ≤ 1−
δ4
4 log2 |Y| (1− P c(A(s, v, δ)|s, v)). (8.51)
Until this point, no assumption has made on the size of the set MgoodN (s, v, δ). We now assume
(this assumption will be relaxed in Steps 10 and 11 of the proof) that
|MgoodN (s, v, δ)| ≥ 2N [R−δ
2/3]. (8.52)
Hence (8.23) implies |A(s, v, δ)| > 2N(2R−δ2) for N larger than some N0(δ). Then we obtain the
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sphere-packing inequality
P c(A(s, v, δ)|s, v)
(a)
=
1
|A(s, v, δ)|
∑
(i,j)∈A(s,v,δ)
P c(i, j|s, v)
(b)
=
1
|A(s, v, δ)|
∑
(i,j)∈A(s,v,δ)
∑
y∈Tδ(s,v,i,j)∩(Di(s,v)∪Dj (s,v))
pNY |X1X2(y|xi(s, v),xj(s, v))
(c)
=
2
|A(s, v, δ)|
∑
(i,j)∈A(s,v,δ)
∑
y∈Tδ(s,v,i,j)∩Di(s,v)
pNY |X1X2(y|xi(s, v),xj(s, v))
< 2−N(2R−δ
2)+1
∑
(i,j)∈A(s,v,δ)
∑
y∈Tδ(s,v,i,j)∩Di(s,v)
pNY |X1X2(y|xi(s, v),xj(s, v))
(d)
≤ 2−N(2R−δ2)+1
2NR∑
i=1
∑
j∈MA−good
N
(s,v,i,δ)
∑
y∈Tδ(s,v,i,j)∩Di(s,v)
pNY |X1X2(y|xi(s, v),xj(s, v))
(e)
≤ 2−N(2R−δ2)+1
2NR∑
i=1
∑
j∈MA−good
N
(s,v,i,δ)
2N [θij(s,v)+δ
2/8]
∑
y∈Tδ(s,v,i,j)∩Di(s,v)
r(y|s, v)
(f)
≤ 2−N(2R−δ2−I(s,v)−δ2−δ2/8)+1
2NR∑
i=1
∑
j∈MA−good
N
(s,v,i,δ)
∑
y∈Tδ(s,v,i,j)∩Di(s,v)
r(y|s, v)
= 2−N(2R−I(s,v)−17δ
2/8)+1
2NR∑
i=1
∑
j∈MA−good
N
(s,v,i,δ)
∑
y∈Di(s,v)
1{y ∈ Tδ(s, v, i, j)} r(y|s, v)
(g)
≤ 2−N(2R−I(s,v)−17δ2/8)+1
2NR∑
i=1
∑
y∈Di(s,v)
r(y|s, v)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
2N3
√
δ
< 2−N(2R−I(s,v)−3δ
2−3
√
δ) ∀N > 8
7δ2
(8.53)
where (a) follows from (8.46), (b) from (8.46), (c) holds because the decoding sets Di(s, v) are
disjoint, and because of the symmetry of pY |X1X2 , A(s, v, δ), and Tδ(s, v, i, j); (d) holds because
A(s, v, δ) ⊆ {(i, j) : j ∈ MA−goodN (s, v, i, δ)}; (e) follows from (8.25) and (8.15); and (f) and (g)
follow from (8.20) and (8.41), respectively.
Combining (8.48), (8.51), and (8.53) yields
P goodc (s, v) ≤ 1−
δ4
4 log2 |Y|(1− 2
−N(2R−I(s,v)−3δ2−3
√
δ)) +
72 log2 δ
Nδ4
, ∀N > δ−8, δ < δ∗. (8.54)
Observe that for all 2R > I(s, v) + δ log |Y| + 3δ2 + 3√δ, the conditional correct-decoding proba-
bility P goodc (s, v) . 1 − δ44 log2 |Y| is bounded away from 1 as N → ∞, under the assumption that
|MgoodN (s, v, δ)| ≥ 2N [R−δ
2/3].
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Step 10. We now relax the assumption (8.52). If (8.52) does not hold, then |MbadN (s, v, δ)| ≥
2NR(1−2−Nδ2/3). Further assume both colluders are assigned bad codewords. (This last assumption
is relaxed in Step 11). Analogously to (8.48), we define the conditional probability of correct
decoding,
P badc (s, v) , Pr[correct decoding |S = s, V = v,K ∈ (MbadN (s, v, δ))2 ]. (8.55)
We show that this probability vanishes as N → ∞, for any rate R > 0 and any channel pY |X1X2 .
In particular, for δ < 14000 we have
P badc (s, v) ≤
2
Nδ2
∀s, v. (8.56)
The proof of (8.56) uses the same techniques as in Steps 3, 4, 5, 9, and is given in Appendix D.
Step 11. We finally consider the most general scenario in which a mix of good codewords and
bad codewords is used, and the mix depends on (s, v). By application of the inequality Pr[A] ≤
Pr[A∩B] +Pr[Bc] for any two events A and B, we obtain the following two upper bounds on the
correct-decoding probability, conditioned on S = s and V = v:
Pc(s, v) = Pr[correct decoding|S = s, V = v]
≤
{
Pr[K /∈ (MgoodN (s, v, δ))2 ] + P goodc (s, v)
Pr[K /∈ (MbadN (s, v, δ))2] + P badc (s, v).
(8.57)
Let βN (s, v) , 2−NR|MbadN (s, v, δ)| ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of bad codewords. Substituting (8.56)
into (8.57) yields
Pc(s, v) ≤ min
{
1− (1− βN (s, v))2 + P goodc (s, v), 1− β2N (s, v)
}
+
2
Nδ2
.
The first argument of min{·, ·} increases with βN and the second decreases. The value of βN (s, v)
that maximizes the expression above is the equalizer, 12 [1− P goodc (s, v)], and thus we obtain
Pc(s, v) ≤ 1− [1− P
good
c (s, v)]2
4
+
2
Nδ2
, ∀βN (s, v) ∈ [0, 1]. (8.58)
Hence if P goodc (s, v) is bounded away from 1, so is Pc(s, v).
In particular, if (8.52) does not hold, then βN (s, v) ≥ 1 − 2−Nδ2/3, and Pc(s, v) ≤ 1 − (1 −
2−Nδ2/3)2 + 2
Nδ2
which vanishes as N → ∞ for all R > 0. Conversely, if (8.52) holds, then so
does the upper bound (8.54) on P goodc (s, v). Using this upper bound together with the inequality
(b− a)2 ≥ b2 − 2ac which is valid for 0 < a < b < c, we obtain
[1− P goodc (s, v)]2 ≤

δ4
4 log2 |Y|︸ ︷︷ ︸
=c
(1− 2−N(2R−I(s,v)−3δ2−3
√
δ))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=b
− 72 log
2 δ
Nδ4︸ ︷︷ ︸
=a

2
≥ δ
8
16 log4 |Y| (1− 2
−N(2R−I(s,v)−3δ2−3
√
δ))2 − 36 log
2 δ
N log2 |Y| , ∀N > δ
−8, δ < δ∗.
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Combining this inequality with (8.58) yields
Pc(s, v) ≤ 1− δ
8
64 log4 |Y| (1− 2
−N(2R−I(s,v)−3δ2−3√δ))2 +
9 log2 δ
N log2 |Y| +
2
Nδ2
, ∀N > δ−8, δ < δ∗.
(8.59)
Step 12. We shall maximize the upper bound of (8.59) over s ∈ Tδ and v ∈ VN , which amounts
to maximizing I(s, v) in the exponent. In view of the equivalence of the representations (s, v) and
(ps, q), and recalling (8.24), we have
max
s∈Tδ
max
v∈VN
I(s, v) = max
ps : dV (ps,pS)≤δ
max
q∈QN
I(ps, q)
≤ max
q∈QN
I(pS , q) + δ log |Y| (8.60)
where the inequality follows from (8.45).
The probability of correct decoding satisfies
Pc(fN , gN , pY |X1X2)
=
∑
s∈SN
pNS
∑
v∈VN
pV (v)Pc(s, v)
≤ Pr[S /∈ Tδ] + max
s∈Tδ
max
v∈VN
Pc(s, v)
(a)
≤ (N + 1)|S| 2−Nδ2/ ln 4 + 9 log
2 δ
N log2 |Y| +
2
Nδ2
+1− δ
8
64 log4 |Y|
(
1−max
s∈Tδ
max
v∈VN
2−N(2R−I(s,v)−3δ
2−3
√
δ)
)
(b)
≤ (N + 1)|S| 2−Nδ2/ ln 4 + 9 log
2 δ
N log2 |Y| +
2
Nδ2
+1− δ
8
64 log4 |Y| (1− 2
−N(2R−maxq I(pS ,q)−δ log |Y|−3δ2−3
√
δ)), ∀N > δ−8, δ < δ∗ (8.61)
where (a) follows from (8.44) and (8.59) and (b) from (8.60). Thus for all 2R > maxq I(pS, q) +
δ log |Y|+ 3δ2 + 3√δ,
Pc(fN , gN , pY |X1X2) . 1−
δ8
64 log4 |Y| as N →∞ (8.62)
is bounded away from 1.
Step 13. We now bound maxq I(pS , q) in (8.61) by a quantity that does not depend on N . Since
IpQpT pSp2X|SQT pY |X1X2
(X1,X2;Y |S,Q, T ) =
∑
q∈QN
pQ(q) I(pS , q),
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we have
max
q∈QN
I(pS , q) = max
pQ∈PQ
IpQpT pSp2X|SQTpY |X1X2
(X1,X2;Y |S,Q, T )
(a)
≤ max
pQT∈PQT
IpQT pSp2X|SQT pY |X1X2
(X1,X2;Y |S,Q, T )
(b)
= max
pW∈PW
IpW pSp2X|SW pY |X1X2
(X1,X2;Y |S,W ) (8.63)
where (a) holds because the maximization is over a larger domain (pQT is now unconstrained over
WN , QN×{1, 2, · · · , N}), and (b) is obtained by defining the random variableW = (Q,T ) ∈ WN .
Moreover
max
pW∈PW
I(X1,X2;Y |S,W ) ≤ sup
L→∞
max
pW∈PW
I(X1,X2;Y |S,W )
= lim
L→∞
max
pW∈PW
I(X1,X2;Y |S,W ) (8.64)
where the alphabet for W in the right side is {1, 2, · · · , L}, and the supremum and the limit are
equal because the supremand is nondecreasing in L.
Combining (8.61), (8.63), and (8.64), we conclude that
P ∗c (fN , gN ,W
fair
K,δ ) , min
pY |X1X2∈W fairK,δ
Pc(fN , gN , pY |X1X2) (8.65)
is bounded away from 1 as N →∞ for all δ ∈ (0, δ∗) and all sequences of codes (fN , gN ) of rate
R >
1
2
[
min
pY |X1X2∈W fairK,δ
lim
L→∞
max
pW∈PW
I(X1,X2;Y |S,W ) + δ log |Y|+ 3δ2 + 3
√
δ
]
.
Letting δ ↓ 0, we conclude that reliable decoding is possible only if
R ≤ min
pY |X1X2∈W fairK
lim
L→∞
max
pW∈PW
1
2
I(X1,X2;Y |S,W )
= lim
L→∞
min
pY |X1X2∈W fairK
max
pW∈PW
1
2
I(X1,X2;Y |S,W )
= lim
L→∞
max
pW∈PW
min
pY |X1X2∈W fairK
1
2
I(X1,X2;Y |S,W )
where the second equality holds by application of the minimax theorem: the mutual information
functional is linear (hence concave) in pW and convex in pY |X1X2 , and the domains of pW and
pY |X1X2 are convex. Since the above inequality holds for all feasible pX|SW , we obtain
R ≤ lim
L→∞
max
pX1X2W |S∈PX1X2W |S(pS ,L,D1)
min
pY |X1X2∈W fairK
1
2
I(X1,X2;Y |S,W )
= C˜one(D1,W
fair
K ).
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This concludes the proof. 8 ✷
9 Proof of Theorem 4.1
We derive the error exponents for the threshold decision rule (4.1). By symmetry of the codebook
construction, the error probabilities will be independent of K. Without loss of optimality, we
assume that K = K = {1, 2, · · · ,K}. Recalling that W = {1, 2, · · · , L}, denote by P [N ]XW (L) the set
of joint types over X ×W. Define
P
[N ]
Y XK|W (pxw,WK , R, L,m) =
{
pyxK|w : pxK|w ∈ M (px|w), py|xK ∈ WK(pxK), I(xm;y|w) ≤ R
}
E˜psp,m,N (R,L, pxw,WK) = min
pyx
K
|w∈P[N]Y X
K
|W
(pxw,WK ,R,L,m)
D(pyxK|w‖py|xK pKx|w | pw) (9.1)
E˜psp,N (R,L, pxw,WK) = max
m∈K
E˜psp,m,N (R,L, pxw,WK), (9.2)
E˜psp,N (R,L, pxw,WK) = min
m∈K
E˜psp,m,N (R,L, pxw,WK) (9.3)
and
Epsp,N (R,L,WK) = max
pxw∈P[N]XW (L)
E˜psp,1,N (R,L, pxw,W
fair
Knom). (9.4)
Denote by p∗xw the maximizer above (which implicitly depends on R) and by T ∗xw the corresponding
type class. Let
Epsp,N (R,L,WK) = E˜psp,N (R,L, p
∗
xw,WK), (9.5)
Epsp,N (R,L,WK) = E˜psp,N (R,L, p
∗
xw,WK). (9.6)
The expressions (9.1)—(9.6) differ from (4.3)—(4.8) in that the optimizations are performed over
types instead of general p.m.f.’s. We have
lim
N→∞
Epsp,N (R,L,WK) = Epsp(R,L,WK) (9.7)
lim
N→∞
Epsp,N (R,L,WK) = Epsp(R,L,WK) (9.8)
by (2.11) and continuity of the divergence and mutual-information functionals.
With the joint type class T ∗xw specified below (9.4), we now restate the coding and decoding
scheme.
8The case of more than two colluders would be treated as follows. Say there are three colluders. The definition of
the restricted class of channels (8.6) would be extended as follows:
W
fair
K,δ =
{
pY |X1X2X3 ∈ W
fair
K : pY |X1X2X3(y|x1, x2, x3) ≥ δ, ∀y, x1, x2, x3,,
δ ≤ D(pY |X1=x1,X2=x2,X3=x3‖pY |X1=x′1,X2=x′2,X3=x′3) ≤ log δ
−1
, ∀(x1, x2, x3) 6= (x
′
1, x
′
2, x
′
3)
}
Then the notions of equivalence of Hamming distance and statistical indistinguishability of two codewords apply
similarly to the case of two colluders, as does the key property of bounded overlap of the typical sets, and the
derivation of the sphere-packing inequality in Step 9.
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Codebook. A random constant-composition code C(w) = {xm, 1 ≤ m ≤ 2NR} is generated
for each w ∈ T ∗w by drawing 2NR sequences independently and uniformly from the conditional type
class T ∗
x|w.
Encoder. A sequence w is drawn uniformly from T ∗w and shared with the receiver. User m is
assigned codeword xm from C(w), for 1 ≤ m ≤ 2NR.
Decoder. Given (y,w), the decoder places user m on the guilty list if I(xm;y|w) > R+∆.
Collusion Channel. The random code described above is a RM code. By Prop. 2.2, it is suf-
ficient to restrict our attention to strongly exchangeable collusion channels for the error probability
analysis. Recall from (2.16) and (2.17) that for such channels,
pY|XK(y˜|xK) =
Pr[Ty|xK ]
|Ty|xK |
≤ 1|Ty|xK |
1{py|xK ∈ WK(pxK)}, ∀ y˜ ∈ Ty|xK . (9.9)
Error Exponents. The derivation is based on the following two asymptotic equalities which
are special cases of (10.12) and (10.16) proven later.
1) Fix w and y and draw x uniformly from a fixed conditional type class T ∗
x|w, independently of
y. Then for any ν ≥ 0,
Pr[I(x;y|w) ≥ ν] ≤ 2−Nν . (9.10)
2) Fix w, draw xm, m ∈ K, i.i.d. uniformly from a fixed conditional type class Tx|w, and then draw
Y uniformly from the type class Ty|xK . For any strongly exchangeable collusion channel, for any
m ∈ K and ν ≥ 0, we have
Pr[I(xm;y|w) ≤ ν] .= exp2{−NE˜psp,m,N (ν, L, pxw,WK)}. (9.11)
(i). False Positives. A false positive occurs if
∃m /∈ K : I(xm;y|w) > R+∆. (9.12)
By construction of the codebook, xm is conditionally independent of y given w, for each m /∈ K.
There are at most 2NR−K possible values for m in (9.12). Hence the probability of false positives,
conditioned on the joint type class TyxKw, is
PFP(TyxKw,WK) = Pr[∃m /∈ K : I(xm;y|w) > R+∆]
(a)
≤ (2NR −K)PrX[I(x;y|w) > R+∆]
(b)
≤ 2NR 2−N(R+∆) = 2−N∆ (9.13)
where (a) follows from the union bound, and (b) from (9.10) with ν = R+∆. Averaging over all
type classes TyxKw, we obtain PFP
≤ 2−N∆, from which (4.9) follows.
(ii). Detect-One Error Criterion. (Miss all colluders.) We first derive the error exponent
for the event that the decoder misses a specific colluder m ∈ K. Any coalition Kˆ that contains m
fails the test (4.1), i.e., for any such Kˆ,
I(xm;y|w) ≤ R+∆. (9.14)
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The probability of the miss-m event, given the joint type p∗xw, is therefore upper-bounded by the
probability of the event (9.14). From (9.11) we obtain
pmiss−m(p∗xw,WK) ≤ Pr [I(xm;y|w) ≤ R+∆]
(a)
≤ exp2{−NE˜psp,m,N (R+∆, L, p∗xw,WK)}. (9.15)
The miss-all event is the intersection of the miss-m events over m ∈ K. Its probability is
pmiss−all(p∗xw,WK) = Pr
[ ⋂
m∈K
{miss m | p∗xw}
]
≤ min
m∈K
pmiss−m(p∗xw,WK)
(a).
= min
m∈K
exp2{−NE˜psp,m,N (p∗xw, R +∆, L,WK)}
(b)
.
= exp2{−NEpsp,N (R+∆, L,WK)}
(c)
.
= exp2{−NEpsp(R+∆, L,WK)}
were (a) follows from (9.15), (b) from (9.2) and (9.5), and (c) from (9.7).
(iii). Detect-All Error Criterion. (Miss Some Colluders.) The miss-some event is the union
of the miss-m events over m ∈ K. Its probability is
pmiss−some(p∗xw,WK) = Pr
[ ⋃
m∈K
{miss m | p∗xw}
]
≤
∑
m∈K
pmiss−m(p∗xw,WK)
.
= max
m∈K
exp2{−NE˜psp,m,N (R+∆, L, p∗xw,WK)}
(a)
= exp2{−NEpsp,N (R+∆, L,WK)}
(b)
.
= exp2{−NEpsp(R+∆, L,WK)}
where (a) follows from (9.3) and (9.6), and (b) from (9.8).
(iv). Fair Collusion Channels. Recall (4.2), restated here for convenience:
PY XK|W (pXW ,WK , R, L,m) ,
{
p˜Y XK|W : p˜XK|W ∈ M (pX|W ), p˜Y |XK ∈ WK(p˜XK),
Ip˜YXK|W pW (Xm;Y |W ) ≤ R
}
, m ∈ K.
The union of these sets over m,
P∗(WK) ,
⋂
m∈K
PY XK|W (pXW ,WK , R, L,m) (9.16)
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is convex and permutation-invariant because so is WK , by assumption. Combining (9.16), (4.2),
and (4.3), we may write (4.4) as
E˜psp(R,L, pXW ,WK) = min
p˜YX
K
|W ∈P∗(WK )
D(p˜Y XK|W‖p˜Y |XK pKX|W | pW ). (9.17)
For any p˜Y XK|W ∈ P∗(WK) and permutation π of K, define the permuted conditional p.m.f.
p˜πY XK|W (y, xK|w) = p˜Y XK|W (y, xπ(K)|w)
and the permutation-averaged p.m.f. p˜fairY XK|W =
1
K!
∑
π p˜
π
Y XK|W which also belongs to the convex
set P∗(WK). We similarly define p˜πY |XK and p˜fairY |XK . Observe that D(p˜πY XK|W‖p˜πY |XK pKX|W |pW ) is
independent of π. By convexity of Kullback-Leibler divergence, this implies
D(p˜fairY XK|W ‖p˜fairY |XK pKX|W |pW ) ≤
1
K!
∑
π
D(p˜πY XK|W‖p˜πY |XK pKX|W |pW )
= D(p˜Y XK|W‖p˜Y |XK pKX|W |pW ). (9.18)
Therefore the minimum in (9.17) is achieved by a permutation-invariant p˜Y XK|W = p˜
fair
Y XK|W , and
the same minimum would have been obtained if WK had been replaced with W
fair
K . Hence
E˜psp(R,L, pXW ,WK) = E˜psp(R,L, pXW ,W
fair
K ).
Substituting into (4.7) and (4.10), we obtain
Eone(R,L,WK ,∆) = E
one(R,L,W fairK ,∆).
(v). The equality
Eone(R,L,W fairK ,∆) = E
all(R,L,W fairK ,∆)
is straightforward because E˜psp,m(R,L, pXW ,W
fair
K ) in (4.3) is the same for all m ∈ K, and thus
Epsp(R,L,W
fair
K ) = Epsp(R,L,W
fair
K ).
(vi). Positive Error Exponents. From Part (v) above, we may restrict our attention to
WK = W
fair
K . Consider any W = {1, · · · , L} and pW that is positive over its support set (if it is
not, reduce the value of L accordingly.) For any m ∈ K, the minimand in the expression (4.3) for
E˜psp,m(R,L, pXW ,W
fair
K ) is zero if and only if
p˜Y XK|W = p˜Y |XK p
K
X|W , with p˜Y |XK ∈ W fairK (p˜XK).
Such p˜Y XK|W is feasible for (4.2) if and only if (pXW , p˜Y |XK) is such that I(Xm;Y |W ) ≤ R. It is
not feasible, and thus a positive exponent Eone is guaranteed, if R < I(X1;Y |W ). The supremum
of all such R is given by (4.12) and is achieved by letting ∆→ 0 and L→∞. ✷
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10 Proof of Theorem 5.2
We derive the error exponents for the MPMI decision rule (5.7). Again by symmetry of the codebook
construction, the error probabilities will be independent of K. Without loss of optimality, we assume
that K = K = {1, 2, · · · ,K}. We have also defined W = {1, 2, · · · , L}. Define for all A ⊆ K
P
[N ]
Y XK|SW (pw, ps|w, px|sw,WK , R, L,A) =
{
pyxK|sw : pxK|sw ∈ M (px|sw), py|xK ∈ WK(pxK) ,
◦
I(xA;yxK\A|sw) ≤ |A|R
}
(10.1)
E˘psp,A,N (R,L, pw, ps|w, px|sw,WK) = min
pyx
K
|sw∈P[N]Y X
K
|SW
(pw, ps|w, px|sw,WK ,R,L,A)
D(pyxK|sw‖py|xK pKx|sw | psw), (10.2)
Eˆpsp,A,N (R,L, pw, ps|w, px|sw,WK) = D(ps|w‖pS |pw) + E˘psp,A,N(R,L, pw, ps|w, px|sw,WK)
= min
pyx
K
|sw∈P[N]Y XK|SW (pw, ps|w, px|sw,WK ,R,L,A)
D(pyxK|sw ps|w‖py|xK pKx|sw pS | pw), (10.3)
Eˆpsp,N (R,L, pw, ps|w, px|sw,WK) = Eˆpsp,K,N(R,L, pw, ps|w, px|sw,WK), (10.4)
Eˆpsp,N (R,L, pw, ps|w, px|sw,WK) = min
A⊆K
Eˆpsp,A,N (R,L, pw, ps|w, px|sw,WK), (10.5)
Epsp,N (R,L,D1,WK) = max
pw∈P[N]W
min
ps|w∈P[N]S|W
max
px|sw∈P[N]X|SW (psw,L,D1)
Eˆpsp,K,N(R,L, pw, ps|w, px|sw,W fairKnom), (10.6)
where the second equality in (10.3) is obtained by application of the chain rule for divergence.
Denote by p∗w and p∗x|sw the maximizers in (10.6), the latter viewed as a function of ps|w.
Moreover, both p∗w and p∗x|sw implicitly depend on R and W
fair
Knom
. Denote by T ∗w and T ∗x|sw the
corresponding type and conditional type classes. Let
Epsp,N (R,L,D1,WK) = min
ps|w
Eˆpsp,N (R,L, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
x|sw,WK) (10.7)
Epsp,N (R,L,D1,WK) = minps|w
Eˆpsp,N (R,L, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
x|sw,WK). (10.8)
The exponents (10.3)—(10.8) differ from (5.11)—(5.16) in that the optimizations are performed
over conditional types instead of general conditional p.m.f.’s. We have
lim
N→∞
Epsp,N(R,L,D1,WK) = Epsp(R,L,D1,WK) (10.9)
lim
N→∞
Epsp,N(R,L,D1,WK) = Epsp(R,L,D1,WK) (10.10)
by (2.11) and continuity of the divergence and mutual-information functionals.
Codebook. For each w ∈ T ∗w and s ∈ SN , a codebook C(s,w) = {xm, 1 ≤ m ≤ 2NR} is
generated by drawing 2NR random vectors independently and uniformly from T ∗
x|sw.
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Encoder. A sequence w is drawn uniformly from T ∗w and shared with the decoder. Given s
and w, user m is assigned codeword xm ∈ C(s,w).
Decoder. The decoding rule is the MPMI rule of (5.7).
Collusion Channel. This random code is a RM code, hence by application of Prop. 2.2, it is
sufficient to restrict our attention to strongly exchangeable collusion channels.
Error Probability Analysis. To analyze the error probability for our random-coding scheme
under strongly exchangeable collusion channels, we will again use the bound (9.9) as well as the
following three properties, which originate from the basic inequalities (1.1) and (1.2).
1) Fix (s,w) and z ∈ ZN , and draw xK = {xm, m ∈ K} i.i.d. uniformly from a conditional type
class Tx|sw, independently of z. We have the asymptotic equality
Pr[TxK|zsw] =
|TxK|zsw|
|Tx|sw|K
.
= 2−N [KH(x|sw)−H(xK|zsw)] = 2−N
◦
I(xK;z|sw) (10.11)
where the last equality is due to (5.2). Then
Pr[
◦
I(xK; z|sw) ≥ ν] =
∑
Tx
K
|zsw
Pr[TxK|zsw]1{
◦
I(xK; z|sw) ≥ ν}
.
=
∑
Tx
K
|zsw
2−N
◦
I(xK;z|sw) 1{
◦
I(xK; z|sw) ≥ ν}
.
= max
Tx
K
|zsw
2−N
◦
I(xK;z|sw) 1{
◦
I(xK; z|sw) ≥ ν}
≤ 2−Nν . (10.12)
2) Fix w and draw s i.i.d. pS. We have [12]
Pr[Ts|w]
.
= 2−ND(ps|w‖pS |pw). (10.13)
3) Fix (s,w), draw xk, k ∈ K, i.i.d. uniformly from a conditional type class Tx|sw, and then draw
Y uniformly from a single conditional type class Ty|xK . We have
Pr[TyxK|sw] = Pr[Ty|xKsw]Pr[TxK|sw]
=
|Ty|xKsw|
|Ty|xK |
|TxK|sw|
|Tx|sw|K
.
= 2−N [H(y|xK)−H(y|xKsw)] 2−N [KH(x|sw)−H(xK|sw)]
= exp2
{
−N [I(y; sw|xK) +
◦
I(x1; · · · ;xK |sw)]
}
. (10.14)
Consider the two terms in brackets above. The first one may be written as
I(y; sw|xK) = D(pysw|xK‖py|xK psw|xK | pxK)
= D(pyswxK‖py|xK pswxK)
= D(pyxK|sw‖py|xK pxK|sw | psw)
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and the second one as ◦
I(x1; · · · ;xK |sw) = D(pxK|sw‖pKx|sw | psw).
By application of the chain rule for divergence, the sum of these two terms is
D(pyxK|sw‖py|xK pKx|sw | psw). Substituting into (10.14), we obtain
Pr[TyxK|sw]
.
= exp2
{
−ND(pyxK|sw‖py|xK pKx|sw | psw)
}
. (10.15)
In the derivation below we use the shorthand e(pyxK|sw) to represent the exponential above, and
fix Tx|sw = T ∗x|sw.
For any feasible, strongly exchangeable collusion channel, for any A ⊆ K and ν > 0, conditioning
on w ∈ T ∗w and s ∈ SN , we have
Pr
[◦
I(xA;yxK\A|sw) ≤ |A|ν
]
(a)
≤
∑
feasible Tyx
K
|sw
Pr[TyxK|sw]1{
◦
I(xA;yxK\A|sw) ≤ |A|ν}
(b)
.
=
∑
feasible pyx
K
|sw
e(pyxK|sw)1{
◦
I(xA;yxK\A|sw) ≤ |A|ν}
(c).
= max
feasible pyx
K
|sw
e(pyxK|sw)1{
◦
I(xA;yxK\A|sw) ≤ |A|ν}
= max
pyx
K
|sw : px
K
|sw∈M (p∗x|sw), py|xK∈WK
e(pyxK|sw)1{
◦
I(xA;yxK\A|sw) ≤ |A|ν}
= max
pyx
K
|sw : px
K
|sw∈M (p∗x|sw), py|xK∈WK ,
◦
I(xA;yxK\A|sw)≤|A|ν
e(pyxK|sw)
(d)
= max
pyx
K
|sw∈P[N]Y X
K
|SW
(p∗w, ps|w, p
∗
x|sw
,WK ,ν,L,A)
e(pyxK|sw)
(e)
= exp2
{
−NE˘psp,A,N (ν, L, p∗w, ps|w, p∗x|sw,WK)
}
(10.16)
where (a) follows from (9.9), (b) from (10.15), (c) from the fact that the number of conditional
types is polynomial in N , (d) from (10.1), and (e) from (10.2).
(i). False Positives. A false positive occurs if Kˆ \ K 6= ∅. By application of (5.8), we have
∀A ⊆ Kˆ :
◦
I(xA;yxKˆ\A |sw) > |A|(R +∆). (10.17)
Denote by B the set of colluder indices m ∈ K that are correctly identified by the decoder, and
by A , Kˆ \ B the complement set, which is comprised of all incorrectly accused users and has
cardinality |A| ≥ 1. By construction of the codebook, xA is independent of y and xB. The
probability of the event (10.17) is upper-bounded by the probability of the larger event
∃A 6⊆ K, ∃B ⊆ K :
◦
I(xA;yxB |sw) > |A|(R +∆). (10.18)
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Hence the probability of false positives, conditioned on TyxKsw, satisfies
PFP(TyxKsw,WK)
≤ Pr
 ⋃
|A|≥1
⋃
B⊆K
{
∃A 6⊆ K :
◦
I(xA;yxB |sw) > |A|(R +∆)
}
= Pr
 ⋃
|A|≥1
{
∃A 6⊆ K : max
B⊆K
◦
I(xA;yxB |sw) > |A|(R+∆)
}
= Pr
 ⋃
|A|≥1
{
∃A 6⊆ K :
◦
I(xA;yxK |sw) > |A|(R +∆)
}
(a)
≤
∑
|A|≥1
2N |A|R Pr
[◦
I(xA;yxK |sw) > |A|(R +∆)
]
(b).
=
∑
|A|≥1
2N |A|R 2−N |A|(R+∆)
=
∑
|A|≥1
2−N |A|∆
.
= 2−N∆ (10.19)
where (a) follows from the union bound, and (b) from (10.12) with xA and yxK in place of xK and
z, respectively. Averaging over all joint type classes TyxKsw, we obtain PFP
≤ 2−N∆, from which
(5.17) follows.
(ii). Detect-All Error Criterion. (Miss Some Colluders.) Under the detect-all error event,
any coalition K˜ that contains K fails the test. By (5.8), this implies that
∃A ⊆ K˜ :
◦
I(xA;yxK˜\A |sw) ≤ |A|(R +∆). (10.20)
In particular, for K˜ = K = K we have
∃A ⊆ K :
◦
I(xA;yxK\A |sw) ≤ |A|(R +∆). (10.21)
The probability of the miss-some event, conditioned on (s,w), is therefore upper bounded by the
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probability of the event (10.21):
pmiss−some(p∗w ps|w, p
∗
x|sw,WK)
≤ Pr
 ⋃
A⊆K
{◦
I(xA;yxK\A |sw) ≤ |A|(R+∆)
}
≤
∑
A⊆K
Pr
[◦
I(xA;yxK\A |sw) ≤ |A|(R+∆)
]
(a)
≤
∑
A⊆K
exp2
{
−NE˘psp,A,N (R+∆, L, p∗w, ps|w, p∗x|sw,WK)
}
.
= max
A⊆K
exp2
{
−NE˘psp,A,N (R+∆, L, p∗w, ps|w, p∗x|sw,WK)
}
= exp2
{
−N min
A⊆K
E˘psp,A,N(R+∆, L, p
∗
w, ps|w, p
∗
x|sw,WK)
}
(10.22)
where (a) follows from (10.16) with ν = R+∆.
Averaging over S, we obtain
pmiss−some(WK)
=
∑
ps|w
Pr[Ts|w] pmiss−some(p∗w ps|w, p
∗
x|sw,WK)
(a).
= max
ps|w
exp2
{
−N
[
D(ps|w‖pS | p∗w) + min
A⊆K
E˘psp,{m},N (R+∆, L, p∗w, ps|w, p
∗
x|sw,WK)
]}
(b)
= max
ps|w
exp2
{
−NEˆpsp,N (R+∆, L, p∗w, ps|w, p∗x|sw,WK)
}
(c)
= exp2
{−NEpsp,N (R+∆, L,D1,WK)}
(d)
.
= exp2
{−NEpsp(R+∆, L,D1,WK)}
which proves (5.18). Here (a) follows from (10.13) and (10.22), (b) from the definitions (10.5) and
(10.3), (c) from (10.8), and (d) from the limit property (10.10).
(iii). Detect-One Criterion. (Miss All Colluders.) Under the detect-one error event, either
the estimated coalition Kˆ is empty, or it is a set I of innocent users (disjoint with K). Hence
P onee ≤ Pr[Kˆ = ∅] + Pr[Kˆ = I]. The first probability, conditioned on (s,w), is bounded as 9
Pr[Kˆ = ∅] = Pr[∀K′ : MPMI(K′) ≤ 0]
≤ Pr[MPMI(K) ≤ 0]
= Pr[
◦
I(xK;y|sw) ≤ K(R+∆)] (10.23)
.
= exp2
{
−NE˘psp,K,N(R+∆, L, p∗w, ps|w, p∗x|sw,WK)
}
.
9 Using the bound minK′⊆K Pr[MPMI(K
′) ≤ 0] would not strengthen the inequality in (10.23).
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To bound the second probability, we use property (5.9) with Kˆ = I and A = K. We obtain
◦
I(xK;yxI |sw) ≤ K(R+∆)
Since ◦
I(xK;yxI |sw) =
◦
I(xK;y|sw) + I(xK;xI |ysw) ≥
◦
I(xK;y|sw)
combining the two inequalities above yields
◦
I(xK;y|sw) ≤ K(R+∆).
The probability of this event is again given by (10.23); we conclude that
pmiss−all(p∗w ps|w, p
∗
x|sw,WK)
.
= exp2
{
−NE˘psp,K,N (R+∆, L, p∗w, ps|w, p∗x|sw,WK)
}
.
Averaging over S and proceeding as in Part (ii) above, we obtain
pmiss−all(WK) ≤
∑
ps|w
Pr[Ts|w] pmiss−all(p∗w ps|w, p
∗
x|sw,WK)
.
= exp2
{−NEpsp(R+∆, L,D1,K,WK)}
which establishes (5.19).
(iv). Fair Collusion Channels. The proof parallels that of Theorem 4.1, Part (iv). Define
P
∗(WK) , PY XK|SW (pW , p˜S|W , pX|SW ,WK , R, L,K) (10.24)
which is convex and permutation-invariant. Then write (5.12) as
E˜psp(R,L, pW , p˜S|W , pX|SW ,WK) = min
p˜YX
K
|SW ∈P∗(WK )
D(p˜Y XK|SW‖p˜Y |XK pKX|SW | p˜S|W pW ).(10.25)
For any p˜Y XK|SW ∈ P∗(WK) and permutation π of K, define the permuted conditional p.m.f.
p˜πY XK|SW and the permutation-averaged p.m.f. p˜
fair
Y XK|SW =
1
K!
∑
π p˜
π
Y XK|SW , which also belongs
to the convex set P∗(WK). We similarly define p˜πY |XK and p˜
fair
Y |XK. The conditional divergence
D(p˜πY XK|SW‖p˜πY |XK pKX|SW | p˜S|W pW ) is independent of π. By convexity, we obtain
D(p˜fairY XK|SW‖p˜fairY |XK pKX|SW | p˜S|W pW ) ≤ D(p˜Y XK|SW‖p˜Y |XK pKX|SW | p˜S|W pW ). (10.26)
Therefore the minimum in (10.25) is achieved by a permutation-invariant p˜Y XK|SW = p˜
fair
Y XK|SW ,
and the same minimum would have been obtained if WK had been replaced with W
fair
K . Hence
E˜psp(R,L, pW , p˜S|W , pX|SW ,WK) = E˜psp(R,L, pW , p˜S|W , pX|SW ,W fairK ).
Substituting into (5.15) and (5.19), we obtain
Eone(R,L,D1,WK ,∆) = E
one(R,L,D1,W
fair
K ,∆).
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(v). Detect-All Error Exponent for Fair Collusion Channels. Using (5.10) and (5.11),
observe that E˜psp in (5.13) may be written as
E˜psp(R,L, pW , pS|W , pX|SW ,WK) = min
p˜YX
K
|SW∈P∗(WK )
D(p˜Y XK|SW p˜S|W‖p˜Y |XK pKX|SW pS | pW )(10.27)
where
P
∗
(WK) ,
{
p˜Y XK|SW : p˜XK|SW ∈ M (pX|SW ), p˜Y |XK ∈ WK(p˜XK),
min
A⊆K
1
|A|
◦
I(XA;Y XK\A|SW ) ≤ R
}
.
Similarly to the discussion below (10.25), when WK = W
fair
K the minimum over p˜Y XK|SW in (10.27)
is achieved by a permutation-invariant conditional p.m.f.
Next we show that K minimizes 1|A|
◦
I(XA;Y XK\A|SW ) over A ⊆ K. Indeed
1
|A|
◦
I(XA;Y XK\A|SW ) =
1
|A|
[∑
m∈A
H(Xm|SW ) +H(Y XK\A|SW )−H(Y XK|SW )
]
= H(X|SW )− 1|A|H(XA|Y XK\ASW )
(a)
≥ H(X|SW )− 1|K|H(XK|Y SW )
=
1
|K|
◦
I(XK;Y |SW ) (10.28)
where (a) follows from (3.2) with Z = (Y, S,W ).
Using (10.28) and (10.24), we obtain P
∗
(W fairK ) = P
∗(W fairK ). Hence
E˜psp(R,L, pW , p˜S|W , pX|SW ,W
fair
K ) = min
p˜YX
K
|SW∈P∗(W fairK )
D(p˜Y XK|SW p˜S|W‖p˜Y |XK pKX|SW pS | pW )
= E˜psp(R,L, pW , p˜S|W , pX|SW ,W fairK )
and therefore
Eall(R,L,D1,W
fair
K ,∆) = E
one(R,L,D1,W
fair
K ,∆).
(vi). Positive Error Exponents. Consider anyW = {1, · · · , L} and pW that is positive over
its support set (if it is not, reduce the value of L accordingly.) For any A ⊆ K, the divergence to
be minimized in the expression (5.11) for E˜psp,A(R,L, pW , p˜S|W , pX|SW ,WK) is zero if and only if
p˜Y XK|SW = p˜Y |XK p
K
X|SW and p˜S|W = pS .
These p.m.f.’s are feasible for (5.10) if and only if the resulting I(XA;Y XK\A|SW ) ≤ |A|R. They
are infeasible, and thus positive error exponents are guaranteed, if
R < min
A⊆K
1
|A|I(XA;Y XK\A|SW ).
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From Part (iv) above, we may restrict our attention to WK = W
fair
K under the detect-one
criterion. Since the p.m.f. of (S,W,XK, Y ) is permutation-invariant, by application of (3.3) we
have
min
A⊆K
1
|A|I(XA;Y XK\A|SW ) =
1
K
I(XK;Y |SW ). (10.29)
Hence the supremum of all R for error exponents are positive is given by C˜one(D1,WK) in (3.8)
and is obtained by letting ∆→ 0 and L→∞.
For any WK , under the detect-all criterion, the supremum of all R for which error exponents are
positive is given by C˜all(D1,WK) in (3.9) and is obtained by letting ∆→ 0 and L→∞. Since the
optimal p.m.f. is not necessarily permutation-invariant, (10.29) does not hold in general. However,
if WK = W
fair
K , the same capacity is obtained for the detect-one and detect-all problems. ✷
11 Conclusion
We have derived exact fingerprinting capacity formulas as opposed to bounds derived in recent
papers [4, 5, 10], and constructed a universal fingerprinting scheme. A distinguishing feature of
this new scheme is the use of an auxiliary “time-sharing” randomized sequence W. The analysis
shows that optimal coalitions are fair and that capacity and random-coding exponents are the same
whether the problem is formulated as catching one colluder or all of them.
Our study also allows us to reexamine previous fingerprinting system designs from a new angle.
First, randomization of the encoder via W is generally needed because the payoff function in the
mutual-information game is nonconcave with respect to pX|S. Thus capacity is obtained as the
value of a mutual-information game with pXW |S as the maximizing variable. This has motivated
the construction of our randomized fingerprinting scheme, which may also be thought of as a
generalization of Tardos’ design [9]. Two other randomization methods are also fundamental:
randomized permutation of user indices to ensure that maximum error probability (over all possible
coalitions) equals average error probability; and randomized permutation of the letters {1, 2, · · · , N}
to cope with collusion channels with arbitrary memory.
Second, single-user decoders are simple but suboptimal. Such decoders assign a score to each
user based on his individual fingerprint and the received data, and declare guilty those users whose
score exceeds some threshold. While this is a reasonable approach, performance can be improved
by making joint decisions about the coalition. Similarly, the fingerprinting schemes proposed in [9]
and in much of the signal processing literature might be improved by adopting a joint-decision
principle, at the expense of increased decoding complexity.
Finally, several information-theoretic approaches to fingerprinting have been studied in the two
years since this paper was submitted for publication, including work on spherical fingerprinting by
the author [25] and his coworkers Wang [26] and Jourdas [27], on blind fingerprinting [6, 28], on
binary fingerprinting under the Boneh-Shaw model by Amiri and Tardos [29], Huang and Moulin
[30, 31], and Furon and Pe´rez-Freire [32], as well as research on two-level fingerprinting codes by
Anthapadmanabhan and Barg [33].
Particularly noteworthy is [29], which presents a random coding scheme closely related to ours,
with a joint decoder (improving on Tardos’ earlier work [9]) that maximizes a penalized empirical
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mutual information criterion, similarly to Plotnik and Satt’s universal decoder for the random
MAC [11]. Amiri and Tardos use ordinary empirical mutual information instead of our empirical
mutual information
◦
I of K variables. While both choices are capacity-achieving, ours is geared
towards obtaining better error exponents, as is the case for the classical MAC decoding problem [23].
The paper [29] also outlines the proof of a converse theorem for the so-called weak fingerprinting
model, in which a helper discloses all colluders except one to the decoder.
Acknowledgments. The author is very grateful to Dr. Ying Wang for reading several drafts of
this paper and making comments and suggestions that have improved it. He also thanks Yen-Wei
Huang, Dr. Prasanth Anthapadmanabhan, Profs. Barg and Tardos, and the anonymous reviewers
for helpful comments and corrections; and Prof. Raymond Yeung and an anonymous reviewer of [28]
for bringing references [22] and [11], respectively, to our attention.
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A Proof of Lemma 3.1
Due to the permutation-invariant assumption on the joint p.m.f. of (XK, Z), it suffices the establish
(3.1) for A = {1, · · · , k − 1} and B = {1, · · · , k}, where 2 ≤ k ≤ K. The claim then follows by
induction over k. Let Zk = (Z,X
N
k+1), hence Zk−1 = (Zk,Xk). Then (3.1) takes the form
1
k − 1H(X
k−1
1 |Z,XNk ) ≤
1
k
H(Xk1 |Z,XNk+1)
or equivalently
(k − 1)H(Xk1 |Zk) ≥ kH(Xk−11 |ZkXk), 2 ≤ k ≤ K. (A.1)
And indeed the difference between left and right sides of (A.1) satisfies
(k − 1)H(Xk1 |Zk)− kH(Xk−11 |ZkXk)
= (k − 1)[H(Xk|Zk) +H(Xk−11 |ZkXk)]− kH(Xk−11 |ZkXk)
= (k − 1)H(Xk|Zk)−H(Xk−11 |ZkXk)
(a)
=
k−1∑
i=1
H(Xi|Zk)−H(Xk−11 |ZkXk)
(b)
≥ H(Xk−11 |Zk)−H(Xk−11 |ZkXk)
= I(Xk−11 ;Xk|Zk)
(c)
≥ 0
where (a) holds because the conditional p.m.f.’s pXi|Zk , 1 ≤ i ≤ k, are identical due to the permu-
tation invariance assumption. Inequalities (b) and (c) hold with equality when Xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, are
conditionally independent given Zk.
Similarly, to establish (3.2), it suffices to prove that
(k − 1)H(Xk1 |Z) ≤ kH(Xk−11 |Z). (A.2)
We have
(k − 1)H(Xk1 |Z)− kH(Xk−11 |Z)
= (k − 1)[H(Xk−11 |Z) +H(Xk|Z,Xk−11 )]− kH(Xk−11 |Z)
= (k − 1)H(Xk|Z,Xk−11 )−H(Xk−11 |Z)
(a)
=
k−1∑
i=1
H(Xi|Z,Xi−11 ,Xki+1)−H(Xk−11 |Z)
(b)
=
k−1∑
i=1
H(Xi|Z,Xi−11 ,Xki+1)−
k−1∑
i=1
H(Xi|Z,Xi−11 )
= −
k−1∑
i=1
I(Xi;X
k
i+1|Z,Xi−11 )
≤ 0
where in (a) we have used the permutation invariance of the distribution of Xk1 , and in (b) the
chain rule for entropy. ✷
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B Proof of Lemma 3.3
The derivation below is given in terms of the detect-one criterion but applies straightforwardly to
the detect-all criterion as well. Denote by Conememoryless(D1,WK) the compound capacity under the
detect-one criterion. To prove the claim
Cone(D1,WK) ≤ Conememoryless(D1,WK), (B.1)
it suffices to identify a family of collusion channels satisfying the almost-sure fidelity constraint
(2.10) and for which reliable decoding is impossible at rates above Conememoryless(D1,WK). For any
xK, consider the class
W
ǫ
K(pxK) ,
{
p˜Y |XK ∈ PY |XK : min
pY |X
K
∈WK(pxK )
max
xK,y
|p˜Y |XK(y|xK)− pY |XK(y|xK)| ≤ ǫ
}
, ǫ ≥ 0,
(B.2)
which is slightly larger than WK(pxK) but shrinks towards WK(pxK) as ǫ ↓ 0. Continuity of mutual
information and the mapping WK(·) with respect to variational distance (per (2.11) implies that
Cone(D1,W
ǫ
K) ↑ Cone(D1,WK) as ǫ ↓ 0. (B.3)
We now claim that if the coalition selects amemoryless channel pY |XK ∈ WK(pxK), the constraint
py|xK ∈ W ǫK(pxK) is satisfied with probability approaching 1 as N →∞:
∀ǫ > 0 ∃N0(ǫ) : Pr[py|xK ∈ W ǫK(pxK)] ≥ 1− ǫ ∀N > N0(ǫ). (B.4)
To show this, define the set
E =
{
xK : min
xK∈XK
pxK(xK) ≥ ǫ|X |−K
}
.
Without loss of generality 10 assume fN is such that
Pr[xK ∈ E ] ≥ 1− ǫ/2 (B.5)
where the probability is taken with respect to MK,S, V . For any xK ∈ E , xK ∈ XK , y ∈ Y, if y
is generated conditionally i.i.d. pY |XK , the random variable py|xK(y|xK) converges in probability to
pY |XK(y|xK) as N →∞. Hence
PY|XK=xK
[
max
xK,y
|py|xK(y|xK)− pY |XK(y|xK)| ≤ ǫ
]
≥ 1− ǫ/2, ∀xK ∈ E (B.6)
for any N > N0(ǫ). Combining (B.5) and (B.6), we obtain (B.4).
A lower bound on error probability is obtained when a helper provides some information to
the decoder. Assume the constraint on the coalition is slightly relaxed so that they are allowed to
produce pirated copies that violate the constraint py|xK ∈ W ǫK(pxK) with probability at most ǫ, as in
(B.4). In this event, the helper reveals the entire coalition to the decoder. This contributes at most
ǫKNR bits of information to the decoder and does not increase the decoder’s error probability.
Hence
Cone(D1,W
ǫ
K) + ǫK ≤ Conememoryless(D1,WK).
Combining this inequality with (B.3) establishes (B.1). ✷
10 One may always “fill in” each codeword xm with 2ǫ|X |
−KN dummy symbols drawn from the uniform p.m.f. on
X to ensure that (B.5) holds. The rate loss due to the “fill-in” symbols vanishes as ǫ→ 0.
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C Proof of (8.39)
The quantities ζˆ(Y) and ζ are defined in (8.37) and (8.38), respectively. We first analyze
Pr
[
1
{
Dˆijk(Y) ≤ 3δ
2
4
}
> 1{Dijk ≤ δ2} | S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}
]
= Pr
[
Dˆijk(Y) ≤ 3δ
2
4
and Dijk > δ
2 | S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}
]
≤ Pr
[
Dˆijk(Y) < Dijk − δ
2
4
| S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}
]
(C.1)
for any k ∈ MA−goodN (s, v, i, δ). The shorthand Pr denotes the probability distribution on Dˆijk(Y)
induced by the conditional distribution pNY |X1X2(Y|xi(s, v),xj(s, v)). Conditioned on S = s, V =
v,K = {i, j}, the normalized loglikelihood Dˆijk(Y) of (8.34) is the average of N independent
random variables. We show that Dˆijk(Y) converges in probability (and exponentially with N) to
its expectation Dijk of (8.7).
We may write Dˆijk(Y) as a function of the joint type pYxixjxk of the quadruple
(Y,xi(s, v),xj(s, v),xk(s, v)):
Dˆijk(Y) = D(pYxixjxk) ,
∑
y,x1,x2,x′2
pYxixjxk(y, x1, x2, x
′
2) log
pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2)
pY |X1X2(y|x1, x′2)
. (C.2)
Similarly, from (8.7) we obtain
Dijk = D(pxixjxk) ,
∑
y,x1,x2,x′2
pxixjxk(x1, x2, x
′
2) pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2) log
pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2)
pY |X1X2(y|x1, x′2)
. (C.3)
Subtracting (C.3) from (C.2) yields
Dˆijk(Y)−Dijk =
∑
y,x1,x2,x′2
pxixjxk(x1, x2, x
′
2)[pY|xixjxk(y|x1, x2, x′2)− pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2)]
× log pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2)
pY |X1X2(y|x1, x′2)
=
∑
y,x1,x2,x′2
U(y, x1, x2, x
′
2) pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2) log
pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2)
pY |X1X2(y|x1, x′2)
which is a linear combination of the random variables
U(y, x1, x2, x
′
2) , pxixjxk(x1, x2, x
′
2)
[
pY|xixjxk(y|x1, x2, x′2)
pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2)
− 1
]
.
Note that for each x1, x2, x
′
2, the minimum of U(y, x1, x2, x
′
2) over y ∈ Y is nonpositive.
62
Owing to (8.6), we also have
∑
y
pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2) log
pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2)
pY |X1X2(y|x1, x′2)
= D(pY |X1=x1,X2=x2‖pY |X1=x1,X2=x′2)
∈ [δ, log δ−1].
Hence
Dˆijk(Y)−Dijk ≥ (log δ−1) min
y,x1,x2,x′2
U(y, x1, x2, x
′
2). (C.4)
In the sequel we omit the conditioning on s, v, i, j, for conciseness of notation. We bound (C.1) by
Pr
[
Dˆijk(Y) < Dijk − δ
2
4
]
(a)
≤ Pr
[
min
y,x1,x2,x′2
U(y, x1, x2, x
′
2) < −
δ2
4 log δ−1
]
(b)
≤ |X |3|Y| max
y,x1,x2,x′2
Pr
[
U(y, x1, x2, x
′
2) < −ǫ
]
(C.5)
where (a) follows from (C.4); and in (b) we have used the union bound and the shorthand ǫ =
δ2
4 log δ−1 . Denote by Db(α‖p) = α ln αp + (1−α) ln 1−α1−p , 0 < α < 1, the large-deviations function for
the Bernoulli random variable with probability p. Note that Db((1 − ǫ)p‖p) ∼ p
2ǫ2
2(1−p) as ǫ ↓ 0 and
that p
2
1−p >
δ2
1−δ for all δ < p < 1− δ. Define f(δ) = minδ≤p≤1−δDb((1 − ǫ)p‖p). We have
f(δ) ∼ Db((1 − ǫ)δ‖δ) ∼ ǫ
2δ2
2(1− δ) =
δ6
32(1 − δ) log2 δ−1 ≫ δ
7 as δ ↓ 0 (C.6)
hence there exists δ∗ > 0 such that f(δ) > δ7 for all 0 < δ < δ∗.
Define the shorthand β = pxixjxk(x1, x2, x
′
2) ∈ [0, 1]. For each i, j, k and each y, x1, x2, x′2, the
count
βNpY|xixjxk(y|x1, x2, x′2) = NpYxixjxk(y, x1, x2, x′2) =
N∑
t=1
1{Yt = y, xit = x1, xjt = x2, xkt = x3}
is a binomial random variable with βN trials and probability p , pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2) ∈ [δ, 1− δ]. By
(8.6), we have δ ≤ p ≤ 1− δ. Next
Pr[U(y, x1, x2, x
′
2) < −ǫ] = Pr
[
β
(
pY|xixjxk(y|x1, x2, x′2)
pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2)
− 1
)
< −ǫ
]
= Pr
[
Bi(βN, p)
Np
− β < −ǫ
]
.
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For β ≤ ǫ, this probability is zero. For ǫ < β ≤ 1, we have
Pr[U(y, x1, x2, x
′
2) < −ǫ] = Pr
[
β
(
pY|xixjxk(y|x1, x2, x′2)
pY |X1X2(y|x1, x2)
− 1
)
< −ǫ
]
(C.7)
= Pr[Bi(βN, p) < βN(1− ǫ/β)p]
(a)
≤ 2−NβDb((1−ǫ/β)p‖p)
(b)
≤ 2−NDb((1−ǫ)p‖p)
(c)
≤ 2−Nf(δ)
(d)
< 2−Nδ
7 ∀δ < δ∗ (C.8)
where (a) holds by definition of the large-deviations function Db; (b) holds by convexity of the
function Db(·‖p): for all ǫ′ = ǫ/β ∈ [ǫ, 1), we have Db((1 − ǫ′)p‖p) ≥ (ǫ′/ǫ)Db((1 − ǫ)p‖p) with
equality if ǫ′ = ǫ, i.e., β = 1;(c) holds by (C.6); and (d) holds by the lower bound on f(δ).
Combining (C.5) and (C.8), we conclude that (C.1) is upper-bounded by an exponentially vanishing
function of N for each δ < δ∗:
∀i, j, k : Pr
[
1
{
Dˆijk(Y) ≤ 3δ
2
4
}
> 1{Dijk ≤ δ2} | S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}
]
≤ 2−Nδ7 . (C.9)
This does not immediately imply that ζˆ(Y) ≤ ζ with probability approaching 1 because the
definition of ζˆ(Y) in (8.37) involves potentially exponentially many terms Dˆijk(Y). However
Pr[ζˆ(Y) > ζ | S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}]
= Pr
[∑
k
1
{
Dˆijk(Y) ≤ 3δ
2
4
}
>
∑
k
1{Dijk ≤ δ2} | S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}
]
≤ Pr
[
∃pxixjxk : 1
{
Dˆijk(Y) ≤ 3δ
2
4
}
> 1{Dijk ≤ δ2} | S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}
]
(a)
≤ (N + 1)|X |3 max
pxixjxk
Pr
[
1
{
Dˆijk(Y) ≤ 3δ
2
4
}
> 1{Dijk ≤ δ2} | S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}
]
(b)
≤ |X |3|Y| (N + 1)|X |3 2−Nδ7 → 0 as N →∞
where (a) follows from the union bound and the fact that the number of joint types pxixjxk is at
most (N + 1)|X |3 , and (b) from (C.1) and (C.9). This establishes (8.39). ✷
D Proof of (8.56)
Lemma D.1 There exists a partition {M˜i}i∈I of MbadN (s, v, δ) with the following properties:
(P1) ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ M˜i : dH(xi(s, v),xj(s, v)) ≤ 2Nδ;
(P2) ∀i ∈ I : |M˜i| ≥ 2N3
√
δ.
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Proof. By assumption, |MbadN (s, v, δ)| ≥ 2NR(1− 2−Nδ
2/3). The index set I and the sets {M˜i}i∈I
are constructed iteratively as follows. Denote by i the smallest index in MbadN (s, v, δ) and initialize
I = {i} and M˜i =Mi(s, v, δ). By the definition (8.3), M˜i satisfies dH(xi(s, v),xj(s, v)) ≤ Nδ for
all j ∈ M˜i, hence Property (P1) holds. Also, owing to (8.5), Property (P2) holds as well. Next,
find the smallest i ∈ MbadN (s, v, δ) such that dH(xj(s, v),xi(s, v)) > 2Nδ for all j ∈ I, and update
I ← I ∪ {i}. By the triangle inequality, the sets {M˜i}i∈I are disjoint. Repeat this operation
till no such i can be found. At this point, the set I is fixed, and each remaining codeword index
j /∈ ∪i∈IM˜i, satisfies dH(xj(s, v),xi(s, v)) ≤ 2Nδ for some i ∈ I. Assign the index j of this
codeword to M˜i; ties can be broken arbitrarily. Properties (P1) and (P2) of the set M˜i are
preserved. Repeat this operation till all the codeword indices inMbadN (s, v, δ) are exhausted. Upon
completion of this process, the sets {M˜i}i∈I form a partition of MbadN (s, v, δ) and satisfy (P1) and
(P2). ✷
Assume that K = {i, j} ∈ (MbadN (s, v, δ))2 . Consider the partition of Lemma D.1 and a
genie (helper) that reveals the two “clusters” of indices M˜i∗ and M˜j∗ (i∗, j∗ ∈ I) to which i
and j respectively belong. Thanks to the genie, we can enlarge the decoding regions, obtain-
ing {D′m(s, v), m ∈ M˜i∗ ∪ M˜j∗} that are at least as large as the original decoding regions —
Dm(s, v) ⊆ D′m(s, v) — and form a partition of YN . The conditional probability that Y is typical
and that correct decoding occurs (given s, v, i ∈ M˜i∗ , j ∈ M˜j∗) for the original decoder and for the
genie-aided decoder are respectively given by P c(i, j|s, v) in (8.46) and by
P ′c(i, j|s, v, i∗ , j∗) ,
∑
y∈Tδ(s,v,i,j)∩(D′i(s,v)∪D′j(s,v))
pNY |X1X2(y|xi(s, v),xj(s, v)).
Since Dm(s, v) ⊆ D′m(s, v) for all m, we have
P c(i, j|s, v) ≤ P ′c(i, j|s, v, i∗ , j∗), ∀i ∈ M˜i∗ , j ∈ M˜j∗ . (D.1)
The average of the right side over i ∈ M˜i∗ and j ∈ M˜j∗ is denoted by
P ′c(s, v, i
∗, j∗) ,
1
|M˜i∗ | |M˜j∗ |
∑
i∈M˜i∗
∑
j∈M˜j∗
P ′c(i, j|s, v, i∗ , j∗). (D.2)
Let (i∗∗, j∗∗) achieve the maximum of P ′c(s, v, i∗, j∗) over (i∗, j∗), and denote by C1 = M˜i∗∗ and
C2 = M˜j∗∗ the corresponding clusters of indices.
Analogously to Step 3, define the random variables Xi = xiT (S, V ), i ∈ MN , where T is
uniformly distributed over {1, 2, · · · , N} and independent of all other random variables. Define X
andX ′ drawn uniformly and independently from the sets {Xi, i ∈ C1} and {Xj , j ∈ C2} respectively.
The definitions and derivations in Steps 3 and 4 carry, with C1 × C2 in place of (MgoodN (s, v, δ))2 .
In particular, (8.13) becomes
pYt|SV (y|s, v) =
1
|C1| |C2|
∑
i∈C1
∑
j∈C2
pY |X1X2(y|xit(s, v), xjt(s, v)). (D.3)
We again use the reference conditional distribution (8.15), repeated below for convenience:
r(y|s, v) ,
N∏
t=1
pYt|SV (yt|s, v). (D.4)
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For each i, k ∈ C1 and j, l ∈ C2, it follows from the triangle inequality that
dH(xi(s, v),xk(s, v)) ≤ 4Nδ and dH(xj(s, v),xl(s, v)) ≤ 4Nδ.
Hence there are at most 8Nδ positions t at which (xit(s, v), xjt(s, v)) 6= (xkt(s, v), xlt(s, v)). There-
fore, owing to (8.6), the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the distributions of Y conditioned on
codeword pairs (i, j) and (k, l) respectively, satisfies
Dijkl ,
1
N
N∑
t=1
D(pY |X1=xit(s,v),X2=xjt(s,v)‖pY |X1=xkt(s,v),X2=xlt(s,v)) ≤ 8δ log δ−1. (D.5)
Hence the conditional self-information of (8.17) is
θij(s, v) ,
1
N
N∑
t=1
D(pY |X1=xit(s,v),X2=xjt(s,v)‖pYt|S=s,V=v)
(a)
≤ 1|C1| |C2|
∑
(k,l)∈C1×C2
Dijkl
(b)
≤ 8δ log δ−1
where (a) holds by (D.3) and convexity of the Kullback-Leibler divergence, and (b) from (D.5). The
average of the self-information θij(s, v) over all (i, j) ∈ C1×C2 is the conditional mutual information
IpT pX1|SV T pX2|SV T pY |X1X2 (X1X2;Y |S = s, V = v, T )
= I(s, v) ,
1
|C1| |C2|
∑
(i,j)∈C1×C2
θij(s, v) ≤ 8δ log δ−1.
Analogously to Step 5, define the typical sets
Tδ(s, v, i, j) ,

y ∈ YN : 1
N
N∑
t=1
log
pY |X1X2(yt|xit(s, v), xjt(s, v))
pYt|SV (yt|s, v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
θˆij(s,v)
< 9δ log δ−1

. (D.6)
The random variable θˆij(s, v) above is the average of N conditionally independent random variables
(given s, v) and converges in probability to its mean θij(s, v) ≤ 8δ log δ−1. Similarly to (8.26), we
have
Pr[Y /∈ Tδ(s, v, i, j)|S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}] ≤ 1
Nδ2
, ∀s, v, i, j (D.7)
which vanishes as N →∞.
Analogously to (8.47), we define
P badc (s, v) , Pr[correct decoding and Y ∈ Tδ(s, v,K) |S = s, V = v,K ∈ (MbadN (s, v, δ))2 ]. (D.8)
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We have
P badc (s, v) =
1
|MbadN (s, v, δ)|2
∑
i,j∈Mbad
N
(s,v,δ)
P c(i, j|s, v)
(a)
=
1
|MbadN (s, v, δ)|
∑
i∗,j∗∈I
∑
i∈M˜i∗
∑
j∈M˜j∗
P c(i, j|s, v)
(b)
≤ 1|MbadN (s, v, δ)|2
∑
i∗,j∗∈I
∑
i∈M˜i∗
∑
j∈M˜j∗
P ′c(i, j|s, v, i∗ , j∗)
(c)
=
1
|MbadN (s, v, δ)|2
∑
i∗,j∗∈I
|M˜i∗ | |M˜j∗ |P ′c(s, v, i∗, j∗)
(d)
≤ max
i∗,j∗∈I
P ′c(s, v, i
∗, j∗)
=
1
|C1| |C2|
∑
i∈C1
∑
j∈C2
∑
y∈Tδ(s,v,i,j)∩(D′i(s,v)∪D′j(s,v))
pNY |X1X2(y|xi(s, v),xj(s, v))
(e)
≤ 2
N9δ log δ−1
|C1| |C2|
∑
i∈C1
∑
j∈C2
∑
y∈Tδ(s,v,i,j)∩(D′i(s,v)∪D′j(s,v))
r(y|s, v)
(f)
≤ 2
N9δ log δ−1
|C1| |C2|
∑
i∈C1
∑
j∈C2
∑
y∈D′i(s,v)∪D′j (s,v)
r(y|s, v)
(g)
=
2N9δ log δ
−1
|C1| |C2|
∑
i∈C1
∑
j∈C2
 ∑
y∈D′i(s,v)
r(y|s, v) +
∑
y∈D′j(s,v)
r(y|s, v)

=
2N9δ log δ
−1
|C1| |C2| (|C2|+ |C1|)
(h)
≤ 2N [9δ log δ−1−3
√
δ]+1
≤ 2−N
√
δ+1, ∀δ < 1
4000
(D.9)
where (a) and (d) hold because {M˜i}i∈I form a partition of MbadN (s, v, δ), (b) because of (D.1),
(c) because of (D.2), (e) follows from (D.4) and (D.6), (f) is obtained by dropping the restriction
y ∈ Tδ(s, v, i, j), (g) holds because the decoding regions D′i(s, v) and D′j(s, v) are disjoint, and (h)
because |C1|, |C2| ≥ 2N3
√
δ. Thus
P badc (s, v)
(a)
≤ Pr[Y /∈ Tδ(s, v, i, j)|S = s, V = v,K = {i, j}] + P badc (s, v)
(b)
≤ 1
Nδ2
+ 2−N
√
δ+1 (D.10)
where (a) follows from (8.55) and (D.8), and (b) from (D.7) and (D.9). Hence P badc (s, v) vanishes
for all R > 0, all (s, v), and all pY |X1X2 . Moreover
P badc (s, v) <
2
Nδ2
for all δ < 1/4000, and this establishes (8.56). ✷
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